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Reservations About Women: Population
Policy and Reproductive Rights
Paula Abrams*
The number of children a woman may have should not be solely a matter of
her private concern; it should be a matter of profound public concern.1
The 1994 Cairo Population Conference 2 established a consensus that gov-
ernmental population policies must be built on the cornerstones of human
rights. Central to these rights is the principle of reproductive self-determi-
nation; individuals should to be able to choose for themselves the particu-
lars of their reproductive behavior, including the number and spacing of
their children. Reproductive self-determination was not perceived by the
Conference as a newly-created human rights principle because it incorpo-
rates "certain human rights that are already recognized in national laws,
international human rights documents and other consensus documents"
which protect physical integrity and self-determination and applies them to
population programs. 3 From these sources, the Cairo Conference has
articulated a transformative norm that accords the individual the personal
right to make informed choices about reproductive activity. This norm is
of particular significance to women, who often lack control over their own
reproductive decision-making.
In practical terms, articulation of this norm, while significant, is far
removed from its realization in population programs. First, population
policies are classically utilitarian; they seek to manipulate birth rates for
desired demographic goals.4 As such, inherent tension exists between pop-
ulation programs and reproductive self-determination. Second, discrimi-
nation against women remains pervasive throughout the world,
particularly in the developing countries with the most serious concerns
about population growth. This discrimination denies women the most
basic rights of self-determination and reproductive autonomy. Third, con-
flicts between the principle of reproductive self-determination and reli-
* Associate Professor, Northwestern School of Law of Lewis & Clark College. The
author wishes to thank K.C. Becker and Jessica Nadelman for their excellent research
assistance.
1. PAUL R. EHRLICH & ANNE H. EHRLICH, PoPuiATiON-.sOURCES-NVIRONmEN 273
(1970) (italics in original).
2. Report of the International Conference on Population and Development, Programme
of Action of the International Conference on Population and Development, Annex, at 5,
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.171/13 (1994) [hereinafter Cairo Programme].
3. Id. para. 7.3.
4. POPULATION THEORY AND POLICY 441 (JosephJ. Spengler & Otis Dudley Duncan
eds., 1956) (explaining that both expansionist and restrictive population policies are
formed based on, for example, men's welfare, per capita income concerns, and military,
labor, and economic advantages).
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gious traditionalism or fundamentalism present questions of sovereign
imperative and competing human rights. Finally, and perhaps most troub-
ling, the existing human rights principles from which the Cairo norm was
derived have ineffectively protected women's reproductive rights.
Discrimination against women permeates consideration of all these
factors. Women historically were not involved in the development of popu-
lation theory or policy. Without status, power, or rights in most cultures,
women were perceived as the obvious targets of population programs.
Acceptance of reproductive self-determination for women raises specific
issues which go to the heart of historical perceptions about the role of
women in patriarchal society.
This Article examines the dynamics of population policy as they affect
human rights. In particular, it examines the role of law in protecting
women's rights in the formulation and implementation of population pol-
icy. Its thesis is that, because of marginalization or complete disregard of
women's reproductive interests, the law has ineffectively protected
women's reproductive rights. This parsimonious treatment has occurred
both at the international level, with the definition of the public interest, and
at the national level, with the abstention of law from the private and
domestic spheres. At the national level, laws implementing population pol-
icies have not incorporated women's reproductive experiences or needs. In
the international arena, laws that ostensibly protect women have not been
interpreted to preclude violations of bodily integrity and self-determination
manifested in the implementation of some population policies. In addi-
tion, specific human rights documents addressing "women's issues" lack
viable enforcement mechanisms.
The limited success of law in protecting women's reproductive self-
determination is directly related to the patriarchal constructs which shape
the law. Women have been valued historically for their capacity to bear
children. Reproduction, along with other aspects of women's lives, has
generally been controlled by men.5 One element of this control is the
devaluation of women's judgment.6 The legal and cultural devaluation of
women's reasoning ability creates substantial social ambivalence towards
ceding reproductive autonomy to women. Further, the role assigned to
women by patriarchal society-essentially of service to family, husband,
and children-is antithetical to an image of woman as an individual entitled
to self-determination. In fact, this servial role is so deeply embedded
through religious and cultural traditions that it is almost inaccessible to the
5. It is only very recently that safe and effective methods of contraception have
become available. Nonetheless, women historically have sought whatever means avail-
able to them to limit reproduction, including crude contraception and abortion tech-
niques. See Mahmoud F. Fathalla, The Impact of Reproductive Subordination on Women's
Health, 44 Am. U. L. REv. 1179, 1181 (1995).
6. Until the mid-nineteenth century, women in most cultures lacked the legal
capacity to sue, could not hold, manage, or inherit property, and lacked the legal compe-
tence to be considered a person. Women could not give evidence in court or, in some
cases, it took the testimony of two women to equal that of a man. See NoT iN GoD's
IMAGE 144-53, 220-33 (Julia O'Faolain & Lauro Martines eds., 1973).
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rule of law in many societies.7 The persistence of these perceptions of
women results in social responses to the principle of reproductive self-
determination ranging from ambivalence to complete disregard. Religious
traditionalism or fundamentalism also tends to perpetuate valuation of
women primarily for their reproductive role, thereby rejecting reproductive
self-determination.8
These powerful cultural and religious traditions must be addressed
before reproductive self-determination can be realized. In this regard, the
law must function both as norm and process. A rights-based evaluation of
reproductive regulation is a critical first step in changing the patterns of
discrimination against women which deny them basic control over their
lives. These rights must be defined by reference to women's reproductive
experiences. At the same time, a rights-based approach has significant lim-
itations in protecting women's reproductive self-determination. These limi-
tations center around two problems. First, it will be difficult to ensure that
human rights are defined to protect women's reproductive self-determina-
tion since the legal system traditionally has resisted that interpretation.
The more substantial limitation, however, is that even a successful articula-
tion of rights is meaningless if the cultural milieux does not value the pro-
tected right. In other words, not only the rules, but also the playing field
must change to facilitate reproductive self-determination. Cultural tradi-
tions which deny the very principles upon which women's self-determina-
tion rest are not readily accessible to legal change. The more complex
problem therefore is transformation of the cultural climate to make the
exercise of rights available and meaningful to women.
The emergence of reproductive self-determination for women is truly a
paradigm theoretical shift, both in population policy and in the social per-
ception of women. Because of pervasive gender discrimination against
women, reproductive self-determination for women cannot be achieved
without a redefinition of the relationship between the state and women.
Part I of this Article explores the relationship between population the-
ory and human rights. It traces the theoretical bases of population theory
and the tension between its utilitarian premises and human rights princi-
7. Ruth Dixon-Mueller quotes a report on population policy in sub-Saharan Africa
which concludes that "[t]he policies have changed but the system remained fundamen-
tally the same." RUTm DixoN-MuELLER, POPULATION POLICY AN WOMEN'S RIGHTs 22
(1993).
8. Reproductive autonomy facilitates sexual autonomy for women, an unacceptable
outcome in most cultures and religions. See Fathalla, supra note 5; Paula Abrams, The
Tradition of Reproduction, 37 ARiz. L. REv. 453, 463-70 (1995). Regarding contraception,
the Islamic Foundation stated:
Free distribution and easy availability of contraceptives to unmarried, even mar-
ried people away from families, is illegitimate. The uncontrolled distribution of
contraceptives has opened the floodgates of adultery and fornication ... for
turning our women folk, particularly of our high class society, into half prosti-
tutes as in the west, and be condemned to the most perpetual hell ....
Sajeda Amin & Sara Hossain, Women's Reproductive Rights and the Politics of Fundamen-
talism: A View from Bangladesh, 44 AM. U. L. REv. 1319, 1335 (1995) (citing SHAMSUL
Ati, IsL am AND FAmny PLANNING xix (1985).
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pies. Part II examines the development of international reproductive rights
and their application to women. Part III explores the international articula-
tion of women's rights and analyzes the conflict between universal applica-
tion of women's rights and cultural relativism. Part IV synthesizes the
analyses to consider the relationship between population planning policies
and human rights. Finally, Part V applies these considerations to popula-
tion policy as it affects women.
I. Population Theory and Human Rights
In 1798, economist Thomas Malthus postulated that population increases
exponentially while subsistence increases only arithmetically. 9 When
Malthus opined that the human species could double its population every
twenty-five years, he advocated moral restraint as a means of checking pop-
ulation growth. 10 The Neo-Malthusians" evinced less optimism that
humans would exercise such restraint. Recognizing that complex eco-
nomic, social, and biological factors affect population, the Neo-Malthu-
sians concluded that controlling conception was the simplest means to
reducing population growth.' 2 The evidence is to the contrary.
Population programs seek to adjust fertility, mortality, and migration
rates in order to better balance demographic, economic, and resource
dynamics.' 3 Targeting these areas necessarily brings into play not only
demographic goals, but a myriad of connected social programs concerned
with education, health, employment, welfare, housing, and economic devel-
opment.14 This Article focuses on the fertility component of population
policy, whereby the state seeks to regulate population growth through poli-
cies intended to influence family size. Family planning programs, in and of
themselves, do not necessarily involve state regulation of fertility. A family
9. THoMAS R. MALTHus, AN ESSAY ON THE PRINCIPLE OF POPULATION 2-6 (Richard D.
Irwin, Inc. 1963) (1798).
10. Id. Malthus ultimately advocated that a system of private property would
restrain population growth. See id. at 281-82. Since, however, Malthus believed the
human imperative to reproduce to be stronger than any systemic restraint, he advocated
celibacy and delayed marriage as a means to avoid the human suffering which inevitably
follows overpopulation. See id. at 7-8, 264-71.
11. Neo-Malthusians, including Margaret Sanger and Dr. George Drysdale, also view
overpopulation as a cause of poverty, but promote the use of contraceptives and family
planning rather than moral restraint. Paul Meadows, Toward a Socialized Population Pol-
icy, in POPULATION THEORY AND PoLIcy 443, 445 (Joseph J. Spengler & Otis Dudley
Duncan eds., 1956).
12. THOMAS M. SHAPIRO, POPULATION CONTROL POLITICS 17 (1985). For documenta-
tion of the historical struggle to increase the status of women by promoting the control
of conception, see MARGARET SANGER, MY FIGHT FOR BIRTH CoNTROL (1931).
13. DixoN-MuELLER, supra note 7, at 5.
14. Id. at 16. Beginning in the 1950s, demographic theory described four major
direct influences on fertility: use of effective contraception, marriage age of women,
length of time after childbirth when a woman cannot conceive (due to breast-feeding or
abstinence, and availability and use of abortion). Bryant Robey et al., The Fertility
Decline in Developing Countries, ScI. AM., Dec. 1993, at 60, 61. In addition, education,
occupation, wealth, location, religious practices, and social status are considered indi-
rect determinants of fertility. Id. at 62.
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planning program that merely educates individuals and couples on contra-
ception and assists with birth planning does not regulate fertility. A popu-
lation control program, in contrast, includes state actions or regulation
intended to influence the size of families.15
Population policy has always been infused with social politics.
Malthus argued that the uneducated classes, by virtue of their "general cor-
ruption of morals, with regard to ... sex," must be subject to conditions
which "shorten the natural duration of human life."16 These conditions
include "unwholesome occupations, severe labour and exposure to the sea-
sons, extreme poverty, bad nursing of children... diseases, wars, plague,
and famine."'17 The political system should not intervene to correct these
excesses but allow the "natural" cycle of subsistence and distress for the
lower classes to run its course.18 Eugenics theorists emphasized improve-
ment of the quality of the population by maximizing the white-skinned,
Anglo-Saxon population and decreasing all others. 19 Since World War II,
overpopulation has been identified with "others" as the Lesser Developed
Countries in the Third World. Population programs, devised by the indus-
trialized countries and imposed "top down" upon the Third World, have
been accused of "cultural imperialism" as they handed out contraceptives
with little regard for the social and economic conditions responsible for
high fertility.20
Population programs can be characterized as either anti-natalist or
pro-natalist depending upon whether the governmental objective is to
decrease or increase population.21 Inherent to population programs is a
15. DiXoN-MuELLER, supra note 7, at 16-17.
16. MALTHUS, supra note 9, at 7-8.
17. Id. at 8.
18. Id. at 9, 258.
19. SHAPmO, supra note 12, at 33. Eugenics is the belief that the human race can be
improved through the application of genetic principles. Id. The eugenics movement was
popular both in Northern Europe and the United States during the 19th and early 20th
centuries, where concerns about the growing population of immigrants led to restrictive
immigration policies and a push to increase birth rates in the white upper classes, while
reducing birth rates of the "undesirable." Id. at 33-36. See DIXoN-MuELLER, supra note 7,
at 42. See also JAmEs C. MOHR, ABORTION IN AmERIcA 86-88 (1978) (noting that well-off
married women having abortions were considered heartless and depraved, while abor-
tions by poorer, unmarried women were more excusable).
20. See generally Adrienne Germaine &Jane Ordway, Population Policy and Women's
Health: Balancing the Scales, in BEYOND THE NuMBERs 135, 136-39 (Laurie Ann Mazur ed.,
1994) (describing the limited efficacy of conception-oriented strategies).
21. See, e.g., KLAUs M. LnsENGER & KARIN SCHMITT, ALL OUR PEOPLE 49 (1994) (using
the term pro-natalist to describe those favoring moderate population growth); Dorothy
M. Stetson, Family Policy and Fertility in the United States, in POPULATION POLICY ANALYsIs
103, 104 (Michael E. Kraft & Mark Schneider eds., 1978) (defining policies which
reduce the psychological and material costs of having children as pro-natalist and those
which add to the costs as anti-natalist). Generally speaking, population programs usu-
ally encompass several components, including policies aimed at either decreasing or
increasing fertility, a health component aimed at reducing infant and maternal mortal-
ity, and an immigration component designed to control the flow and distribution of
population. DIXoN-MuELLER, supra note 7, at 13-14. Other factors affecting fertility, and
thereby population policies, are legal age of marriage, divorce laws, and health and old-
age security programs. Id. at 16.
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utilitarian perspective on social problems; the greatest social good is the
best policy, with emphasis on the goals rather than the means of achieving
these goals.22 For many years, population was perceived primarily as an
economic issue with little attention given to the social dynamics affecting
fertility.23 Emphasis on lowering birth rates as the primary priority pro-
duces the "machine theory of implementation"24 where individuals, over-
whelmingly women, are viewed as receptacles for contraception services. A
singular focus on lowering birth rates offers little or no consideration of
the overall health of the individual, or her ability to make an informed
choice about contraceptive options.25 Indeed, missing from population
theory and policy for most of its history was specific consideration for the
human rights of the individuals who were the targets of population
programs.
22. For useful descriptions of utilitarianism, see JOHN RAWLs, A THEORY OF JUSTIcE
(1972) (commenting that utilitarians such asJeremy Bentham sacrifice the individual in
favor of promoting the good of society at large).
23. A large part of population policy theory and writings focus on population plan-
ning from an economic standpoint. See, e.g., POPULATION THEORY AND POLICY, supra note
4, (Chapter 5 discussing "Population and Level of Economic Activity" and Chapter 6
discussing "Population Growth and Economic Development"); THE EvoLurIoN OF POPU-
LATION THEORY (Johannes Overbeek ed., 1977) (described by the editor as a textbook on
"population economics"). There are many formulas defining the causes of population
growth or decline. Most focus on the relationship between fertility, mortality, and
resources. Malthus presented one of the earliest formulas when he postulated a straight
correlation between population and total production. See supra notes 9-10 and accom-
panying text. There are many others. For example, Raymond Pearl developed a mathe-
matical formula depicting the rate of growth as a function of the size of the existing
population and the amount of unused resources. See, e.g., E.T. Hiller, A Culture Theory
of Population Trends, in POPULATION THEORY AND POLICY 371, 371 (JosephJ. Spengler &
Otis Dudley Duncan eds., 1956); Alan T. Peacock, Theory of Population and Modern Eco-
nomic Analysis, in POPULATION THEORY AND POLICY 190, 196-97 (Joseph J. Spengler &
Otis Dudley Duncan eds., 1956) (reformulating Malthus' theory to reflect the realities of
Western experience and postulating that population decreases as per capita income
decreases). Environmentalists argue that improved living standards increase consump-
tion and resource depletion beyond the sustainability of the planet; only reductions in
population growth and resource consumption can achieve sustainability. See, e.g., Alan
Thein Durning, The Conundrum of Consumption, in BEYOND THE NUMBERS 40-47 (Laurie
Ann Mazur ed., 1994) ("Only population growth rivals high consumption as a cause of
ecological decline . . . . "). Cf. F. Landis MacKellar & David E. Horlacher, Population,
Living Standards and Sustainability: An Economic View, in BEYOND THE NUMBERS 76 (Lau-
rie Ann Mazur ed., 1994) (arguing that so long as markets function, resource depletion
will stabilize and decrease as global living standards and population increase).
24. See DONALD P. WAwicK, Bn--TR Pius 40 (1982).
25. See Germaine & Ordway, supra note 20, at 136 (commenting that family plan-
ning programs initially measured success by how many women had accepted steriliza-
tion and contraception). Aart Hendriks, Promotion and Protection of Women's Right to
Sexual and Reproductive Health under International Law: The Economic Covenant and the
Women's Convention, 44 AM. U. L. Ray. 1123, 1124 (1995) ("Health and human rights,
however, were commonly perceived as separate and unrelated issues.") (emphasis in
original). See generally Lynn P. Freedman & Stephen L. Isaacs, Human Rights and Repro-
ductive Choice, STUD. FAM. PLAN., Jan./Feb. 1993, at 18 (noting that international health
policies must treat reproduction as inextricably linked to the role and status of women
in society).
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Population policies impact the individual in a variety of ways. Both
anti-natalist and pro-natalist policies may be pursued through regulation
which is direct, indirect, or a combination of both. Pro-natalist policies
may use a variety of indirect incentives to encourage births, such as tax
advantages and favorable marriage, employment, health, or status bene-
fits. 26 More direct regulation, such as denial or restriction of access to
birth control, abortion, or sterilization, 27 also may be invoked. Anti-natal-
ist policies may invoke a corresponding array of direct or indirect regula-
tions to discourage births, including delayed marriage age and various
legal and monetary penalties.2 8 Most anti-natalist policies authorize wide
legal access to a variety of birth control methods, sterilization, and abor-
tion.29 At the far end of the regulatory spectrum, anti-natalist policies may
authorize coercive practices such as forced abortion and sterilization.30
Indirect regulation or incentives present their own problems. Support-
ers insist incentive programs offer real motivation for individuals to change
their reproductive behavior without coercion.3 1 Individuals choose
whether to accept the incentive and its consequences. In reality, incentive
programs are inherently coercive. The most common incentive program is
26. POPULATION THEORY AND Poucy, supra note 4, at 442.
27. Id. at 441. See, e.g., Charlotte Hord et al., Reproductive Health in Romania:
Reversing the Ceausescu Legacy, STUD. F~Ami. PLAN., July/Aug. 1992, at 231 (recounting
direct methods of effecting population policies in Romania); Reed Boland, Abortion Law
in Europe in 1991-1992, 21 J. L. MED. & ETHIcs 72 (1993) (reviewing abortion laws in
post-Communist Europe). Boland notes that Romania had one of the most oppressive
pro-natalist policies. Its ban on abortion, forced gynecological examinations, and moni-
tored pregnancies led to thousands of unwanted pregnancies. Reed Boland, Population
Policies, Human Rights, and Legal Change, AM. U. L. REv. 1257, 1259-60 (1995) [hereinaf-
ter Boland, Population Policies].
28. Id.
29. Access to legal abortion is not always available even in countries which seek to
reduce births. For instance, in Rwanda abortion is only legal when the mother's health is
at risk The same holds true for Guatemala and Honduras. Nigeria, Afghanistan, and
Burma limit abortion to when the mother's life is in danger. Abortion is illegal without
exception in the Philippines, Niger, Chile, Colombia, Haiti, Paraguay, and Peru. JOHN A.
Ross ET At., FAMILY PLANNING AND CHILD SuRvivAL 42-43 (1988). See Stanley K. Hen-
shaw, Induced Abortion: A World Review, 1990, FAm. PLAN. PEasP., Mar.-Apr. 1990, at 76.
These countries often have religious objections to abortion and do not perceive access to
abortion as a necessary element of population reduction. Other countries consider safe
and legal abortion a necessary element of population policy since contraceptive failures
are inevitable. The excessive focus of the Cairo Convention on the role of abortion in
population policy is an example of how divisive this issue has been internationally.
Cairo Programme, supra note 2, arts. VII-VIL
30. China's policy is "one couple, one child." Although China denies coercive prac-
tices, there is overwhelming evidence of mandatory sterilizations, forced abortions, and
infanticide. See James M. Wines, Note, Guo Chun Di v. Carroll: The Refugee Status of
Chinese Nationals Fleeing Persecution Resulting from China's Coercive Population Control
Measures, 20 N.C. J. INr'L L. & COM. REG. 685, 688 (1995) (discussing forced steriliza-
tion); BETSY HARTmANN, REPRODUCnvE RIGHTS AND WRONGS 157-69 (1995) (discussing
China's history of coercive population control). Similar pressures exist in India.
Women there are often denied abortions unless they first agree to an IUD or steriliza-
tion. Id. at 262-63.
31. Hartmann, supra note 30, at 66 (discussing World Bank and AID support of
incentive programs).
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a single payment in exchange for sterilization. 32 Offering an impoverished
family the equivalent of a year's wages or a washing machine in exchange
for sterilization does not offer that family a true choice.33 The state, in
making such "offers," intends to reduce choice rather than enhance it.
These incentives are, at best, a Hobson's choice. Further, population pro-
grams that focus primarily on sterilization and contraception fail to
address the underlying social conditions which encourage large families.
Social, religious, economic, and political factors significantly influence
a country's birth rate.34 Throughout most of history, religious, political,
and cultural institutions valued high birth rates and their policies reflected
this valuation.35 A State's shift to policies indended to reduce birth rates is
just as politically significant. Regardless of whether the governmental pol-
icy is anti-natalist or pro-natalist, optimal population size is perceived as a
critical element of state power and therefore a legitimate regulatory inter-
est. State regulation of population variables therefore often occurs without
consideration for the individuals regulated.
High fertility is encouraged, or commanded, by many religions. 36
Births are considered a divine blessing.37 Religious and cultural factors
may also function to limit births.38 Where a religious sanction of high
birth rates is accompanied by strong discrimination against women, birth
rates are particularly high.39
Historically, large populations were perceived as a necessary compo-
nent of economic and political strength.4° High status and economic privi-
32. Id. at 67. Other forms of incentives include monthly payments every month a
woman does not become pregnant, payments to physicians for sterilizations, payments
to "recruiters" charged with rounding-up "acceptors" for sterilization, and penalties,
such as decreased educational, health, housing, or tax benefits, when a couple has more
than the legal number of children. Freedman & Isaacs, supra note 25, at 24-25.
33. Marika Vicziany, Coercion in a Soft State: The Family Planning Program of India,
Part I: The Myth of Voluntarism, 55 PAc. Ai'. 373, 378 (1982).
34. See Hiller, supra note 23, at 375-84.
35. See infra note 41 and accompanying text.
36. Genesis 1:28 ("Be fruitful and multiply.... "); Martin Luther, Die Tischreden, No.
3613, in 8 LuTmaas WERxE 122, 123 (Otto Clemen ed., 3d ed. 1962) ("Je mehr kinder,
jehe grosser gluck." (The more children, the more good luck)).
37. LEisENGER & Scmrr-r, supra note 21, at 36.
38. Sexual taboos during breast-feeding or menstruation, as well as practices like
postpartum abstinence, prohibitions on remarriage for widows, and length of lactation,
limit birth rates. Id.
39. This demographic result exists in, for example, many Islamic nations. Cf. J.R.
Weeks, The Demography of Islamic Nations, 43 PoPUxrIoN Bua., Dec. 1988, at 1, 45-49
(noting that the high fertility rates in some Islamic nations is not attributable directly to
Islam, but rather to the recency of social and economic development).
40. See Abrams, supra note 8, at 458-63; RosAmND PoLLAcK PErCHEsKY, ABORTION AND
WOMAN'S CHOICE 67-68 (rev. ed. 1990).
Plato and Aristotle both analyzed the ideal city-state from the perspective of optimal
population. The Romans and Chinese tended to value increasing population without
concern about the potential of excess growth. See United Nations, Population Division,
History of Population Theories, in POPULATION THEORY & PoLicY 5 (Joseph J. Spengler &
Otis Dudley Duncan eds., 1956). Patriarchal organization of society is frequently asso-
ciated with military competition to control limited resources. See Frank Lorimer, Culture
and Human Fertility: Conclusions, in POPULTION THEORY & PoLicY 395, 395 (Joseph J.
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leges were bestowed by the state on large families. 41 Early marriage was,
and still is in many countries, sanctioned as a means of increasing popula-
tion.42 It was not until the end of the eighteenth century, when Malthus
argued that population increases faster than sustenance, that theorists and
politicians began to contemplate the potential of excess population.
Large families remain economic necessities in many societies where
children are essential workers.43 High rates of infant mortality provide
incentive for couples to have large families to assure economic survival and
security.44 In some cultures, land is power and the amount of land allo-
cated to a family is determined by family size. 45 Industrialized societies, in
contrast, emphasize accumulation of capital rather than land, and large
families deplete capital without increasing productivity.
4 6
The relationship between population and economic development
remains controversial. The debate is essentially a "chicken and egg" dis-
pute. Some theorists argue that high population hinders economic devel-
opment,47 and that population must be reduced before economic
development can occur.48 Others insist that economic development must
Spengler & Otis Dudley Duncan eds., 1956). In early patriarchal societies, the status of
a man was determined by the number of children he had. Hiller, supra note 23, at 380.
41. "[T]he father of three sons shall be exempt from military service, and he who has
four from all the burdens of the state." As-ro.., Politica, in THE BASIC WoRKs oF ARIs-
TOTLE 1113, 1167 (Richard McKeon ed. & Benjamin jowett trans., 1941). See generally
Abrams, supra note 8, at 456-63, (noting that births became a matter of state interest due
to the military, tax, labor demands, and economics of the family and city-state).
42. Approximately 50% of African women, 40% of Asian women, and 30% of Latin
American women are married by age 18. Men tend to marry much later. Nafis Sadik,
Investing in Women: The Focus of the '90s, in BEvoNI THE Nuim s 209, 211 (Laurie Ann
Mazur ed., 1994).
43. Young children, six to eight years old, may work anywhere from three to more
than ten hours per day. This is particularly true in poor rural areas. See WORLD BANK,
WORLD DwcVoPMErr REPORT 1984, at 59 (1984) [hereinafter WoLD BaNK REPORT].
44. While the overall rate of infant mortality is declining, in the least developed
countries (e.g., Mozambique, Afghanistan, Angola, Mali, Sierra Leone, Bhutan) the aver-
age is still as high as 120 per 1000 births, and in some countries is as high as 297
deaths per 1000 births (one in three births). See LEtsINGER & Scnmrrr, supra note 21, at
45; and Fourth Review and Appraisal of the World Population Plan of Action Experiences
Concerning Population and Development Strategies and Programmes, United Nations,
International Conference on Population and Development, Provisional Agenda Item 8,
at 62, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.171/PC/4 (1994) [hereinafter Fourth Review]. Another signif-
icant factor affecting birth rates in many countries is the lack of any viable social secur-
ity system. In these countries, parents look to their children for support when they are
too old to support themselves. In many developing countries over 80% of parents inter-
viewed expected their children would support them in old age. Woimu BANK REPORT,
supra note 43, at 52.
45. LEISINGER & ScHMrr, supra note 21, at 41.
46. EHRLICH & EHRuICH, supra note 1, at 19.
47. This is the underlying principle of neo-Malthusian doctrine. See supra note 12
and accompanying text.
48. See Barbara Stark, International Human Rights and Family Planning: A Modest
Proposal, 18 DEN. J. INT'L L. & Poi'Y 59, 64 (1989). Some policy-makers fall into a
hybrid middle ground, respecting the link between improving quality of life and popula-
tion reduction but believing that overpopulation is too critical to await the long-term
benefits of social and economic transformation. The World Bank's Report on Population
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occur before population can decrease.49 Population policy thus becomes
part of comprehensive economic and social change, the primary emphasis
of which is improvement of the quality of life. These two theoretical dis-
tinctions are at the heart of very different approaches to population policy.
Where reduction of the birth rate is the goal, extensive distribution of con-
traceptives and sterilization becomes the primary policy. Where the goal is
socioeconomic change, birth reduction becomes a product of social policy
rather than its engine.50
International studies show that generally, as per capita income
increases, the birth rate declines. 5 ' However, some population planners
argue that this dynamic occurs only where there also is an equitable distri-
bution of resources.5 2 The World Population Plan of Action recognizes the
correlation between population and economic development.5 3 It posits
in 1984 insisted that "many developing countries cannot afford to wait for fertility to
decline spontaneously." WORLD BAN REPORT, supra note 43, at 106.
49. HARTmArN, supra note 30, at 291. Some commentators argue that both must
occur and that socioeconomic emancipation of women will only provide short-term
gain. These commentators believe that consumption patterns must be transformed. See,
e.g., Russel Lawrence Barsh, Indigenous Peoples' Perspectives on Population and Develop-
ment, 21 B.C. ENvrL AFi. L. REv. 257 (1994).
50. Socioeconomic change must, of course, include ready access to family planning
information and contraception if meaningful reduction of birth rates is to occur.
51. LEISINGER & ScHMr, supra note 21, at 152-53. For example, studies done in
Colombia and Malaysia during the 1970s show that the families with the lowest incomes
had three times as many children as those with the highest incomes. Id. at 152. Eco-
nomic prosperity also results in decreases in child mortality at birth. Id. at 152, 154.
However, in China, Thailand, Sri Lanka. and Costa Rica, lower birth rates have not been
accompanied by significant positive economic changes. Id. at 155. In other countries,
such as Kenya, Jordan, Algeria, and Nigeria, declining birth rates have not reflected
increases in per capita income. Id. Social and religious factors may explain these devia-
tions. For example, China and Thailand have implemented more "aggressive" popula-
tion policies. Conversely, Sri Lanka implemented broad-based social change to improve
education, health, and social security benefits for all citizens and enhance the status of
women. The crude birth rate in Sri Lanka dropped significantly from 1970 to 1991. See
HARTmA'm, supra note 30, at 297. In developing countries with high birth rates, reli-
gious emphasis on high fertility and the low status of women negate many of the advan-
tages of increased economic prosperity. LEisiNGER & SCHMrrT, supra note 21, at 155.
52. HARTmAN, supra note 30, at 292. The question of the equitable distribution of
resources raises another aspect of the population-development debate. Western coun-
tries' consumption of resources per capita is far in excess of the lesser developed coun-
tries. The industrialized countries, with 22% of the population, consume approximately
70% of the world's resources. See id. at 23. Focusing on overpopulation as the source of
environmental crisis unfairly asks the lesser developed countries to reduce their popula-
tion so the West can continue its excesses. See generally AndrewJ. Ringel, The Population
Policy Debate and the World Bank: Limits to Growth vs. Supply-Side Demographics, 6 Gao.
INT'L ENvrL. L. REv. 213 (advocating limits on population growth to decrease environ-
mental destruction).
53. Report of the International Conference on Population, United Nations, Depart-
ment of Technical Co-operation for Development, at para. 14, U.N. Doc. E/CONF.76/19
(1984); Cairo Programme, supra note 2, para. 1.5 ("[The] Programme of Action builds
on the considerable international consensus ... to consider the... interrelationships
between population [and] sustained economic growth ... ."); Report of the United
Nations World Population Conference, at 3, U.N. Doc. E/CONF.60/19 (1974) [hereinaf-
ter Bucharest Report]. The World Population Plan of Action is a consensus document
resulting from U.N. world population conferences.
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that socioeconomic transformation is the key to reducing population.54
The motto "development is the best contraceptive" arose out of the
Bucharest World Population Conference in 1974.55
Women's reproductive behavior is the focus of most population pro-
grams. Since women bear children, this emphasis appears logical at first
glance. But in most societies seeking to reduce birth rates, men dominate
most, if not all, of the decisions in the family, including reproductive deci-
sions. In reality, women are the target of most population programs
because women have always been subject to extensive social control.5 6 The
message underlying most population programs is that women are not to be
trusted with independent authority over such a significant matter of social
policy.
The legal and cultural impact of such programs is to perpetuate dis-
crimination against women by denying women control over their own
reproductive functions.5 7 This occurs regardless of whether a country's
population policy is pro-natalist or anti-natalist. In either case, the deci-
sion is the state's rather than the woman's. Population programs which
emphasize state manipulation of women's reproduction rather than indi-
vidual decision-making are inherently flawed because they fail to recognize
that the reproduction decision is an essential element of a woman's indi-
vidual dignity.
In the last decade, numerous studies have shown that, while reduction
of birth rates presents complex economic, social, and political issues, the
most consistent factor in reducing birth rates is meaningful change in the
legal and social status of women.58 In particular, education of and eco-
nomic participation by women are the key factors affecting reproductive
behavior.5 9 Women who can only find status and security in society
through children will continue to have many children no matter how many
54. See Fourth Review, supra note 44, at paras. 10-46.
55. See Robey et al., supra note 14, at 64.
56. This assumption of control by men is enhanced by the historical perception of
women as incapable of making reasoned and moral judgments. See supra notes 5-7 and
accompanying text.
57. See SHAPIRO, supra note 12, at 9-12.
58. 3 WORLD POPULATION 1589-1789 (James A. Joyce ed., 1976) (reprinting reports
from various countries made in preparation for the 1974 World Population Conference
that detail the significance of the relationships between the status of women and popula-
tion questions). The reports concluded that "a relationship can be firmly established
between women's access to material and social resources.., and the exercise of choice
in the planning of the number and spacing of their children." Study on the Interrelation-
ship of the Status of Women and Family Planning, U.N. Economic and Social Council,
Commission on the Status of Women, 25th Sess., Provisional Agenda Item 5, para. 24,
U.N. Doc. E/CN.6/575 (1973), reprinted in 3 WORLD POPULATION 1648, 1653 (James A.
Joyce ed., 1976) [hereinafter ECOSOC Study].
59. Fourth Review, supra note 44, para. 50. See also -EEN WARE, WoMEN, DEMOGRA-
P'HI AND DEvE.oPmENr 84 (1981) (An educated woman... is more likely to feel that she
can do something about the conditions of her life, including the conditions of
pregnancies .... .") (citing D. MAMNELBAuM, HuMAN FEmrY N INDIA 54-55 (1974)).
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birth control pills are distributed.60 As far back as the early 1970s, a U.N.
commissioned study of over seventy countries concluded that there is a
strong correlation between women's status and reproductive behavior:
"[Tihe exercise of the right to determine the number and spacing of chil-
dren can have a direct impact on the woman's exercise of her economic
rights."6 1 Employment opportunities increase status, and necessarily
decrease the desire to gain status from having children. 62
These employment opportunities must provide desirable jobs.
Employers too often use perceived family obligations as a justification for
channeling women into low-status, low-paying jobs which offer them little
incentive to change their reproductive behavior.63 Without significant eco-
nomic options, women may perceive few alternatives to large families.6 4
Women must be given real opportunities to participate in the marketplace,
own and control property, and make their own decisions about marriage
and reproduction. When these rights are granted, women invariably
choose options other than having many children.6 5
Studies also have shown that susceptibility to family planning is
affected by the level of equality within the marriage. Where the pregnancy
decision is achieved through unequal power dynamics such as force,
reward, or other forms of patriarchal control, higher fertility rates tend to
occur than where the pregnancy decision is achieved through a joint deci-
sion-making process. 66
Status and reproduction are tightly woven dynamics. Reproductive
autonomy cannot exist in a vacuum. Neither can enhancement of women's
status achieve reductions in birth rates unless broad reproductive choices
are available.
60. Hai-mAumN, supra note 30, at 49 ("If women's powerlessness can increase their
need for children, then steps toward their empowerment could presumably have the
opposite effect. The educational level of women is the single most consistent predictor
of fertility and contraceptive use . . . ."). Kenya is one example of a country where a
vigorous, official family planning program, begun in 1967, failed for many years to
reduce the birth rate. Great disparities in economic levels, high infant mortality, and the
low status of women coupled with continued social pressure upon women to have many
children are some of the socioeconomic factors in Kenya which leave little incentive for
individuals to change their reproductive behavior. Id. at 83. Other disincentives
included the perception that the population program was one imposed by white Wes-
terners to "control" the population. Id. at 85.
61. ECOSOC Study, supra note 58, para. 77.
62. See id. para. 112.
63. Id. para. 78.
64. Id. para. 83.
65. Id. para. 155. The ECOSOC Study found the status of women has "a marked,
and even decisive influence" in demographic change. Id. para. 68(b). In a recent study
of women throughout the developing world, data confirmed that educated women are
more likely to use contraception and that enhancement of women's status furthered this
dynamic. Robey et al., supra note 14, at 63.
66. Paula E. Hollerbach, Power in Families, Communication, and Fertility Decision-
Making, 3 POPULAION & ENv'T 146, 166 (1980).
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II. Development of International Reproductive Rights
The application of human rights norms to reproduction in particular has
evolved much more slowly than the international acceptance of these
norms in general.6 7 The concept of reproductive rights first received inter-
national attention at the International Conference on Human Rights in
Teheran in 1968.68 The Final Act of the Teheran Conference included lan-
guage recognizing that "Parents have a basic human right to determine
freely and responsibly the number and the spacing of their children."69
The phrase "freely and responsibly" became the significant and operative
language in subsequent international documents addressing population
and human rights.70 The World Population Plan of Action adopted in
Bucharest in 1974 expanded the language from the Teheran document to
include the following:
All couples and individuals have the basic right to decide freely and respon-
sibly the number and spacing of their children and to have the information,
education and means to do so; the responsibility of couples and individuals
in the exercise of this right takes into account the needs of their living and
future children, and their responsibilities towards the community. 71
This language not only includes "couples and individuals" instead of par-
ents, but also addresses the means to exercise decision-making rights and
attempts to define responsible decision-making. 72 The first treaty to
include this language was the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
Of Discrimination Against Women (the Women's Convention). 73
67. The first significant international human rights document was the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 183d mtg. at 71,
U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948) [hereinafter Universal Declaration].
68. Final Act of the International Conference on Human Rights, United Nations, U.N.
Doc. A/CONF.32/41 (1968) [hereinafter Teheran Proclamation]. The General Assembly
endorsed the "Proclamation of Teheran as an important and timely reaffirmation of the
principles embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in other interna-
tional instruments. ... " G.A. Res. 2442, U.N. GAOR, 23d Sess., Supp. No. 18, at 49,
U.N. Doc. A/7218 (1969).
69. Teheran Proclamation, supra note 68, at 4. This language has been criticized as
an attempt by the international community to pressure lesser developed countries to
encourage the use of contraception rather than a dear endorsement of reproductive
autonomy. Freedman & Isaacs, supra note 25, at 21-22.
70. See, e.g., Declaration of Social Progress and Development, G.A. Res. 2542, U.N.
GAOR, 24th Sess., Supp. No. 30, art. 4, U.N. Doc. A/7630 (1969); Bucharest Report,
supra note 53, at 39. These documents are consensus policy commitments, not treaties.
Notably, two treaties which address protection of the family, inter alia, fail to include
any language addressing reproductive decision-making. See International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, opened for signature Dec. 19, 1966, 6 LL.M. 360
(1967) [hereinafter Economic Covenant]; International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, opened for signature Dec. 19, 1966, 6 I.L.M. 368 (1967) [hereinafter Political
Covenant].
71. Bucharest Report, supra note 53, at 7.
72. See Freedman & Isaacs, supra note 25, at 22.
73. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women,
opened for signature Mar. 1, 1980, G.A. Res. 34/180, U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., Agenda
Item 75, U.N. Doc. A/RES/34/180 (1980), reprinted in 19 LL.M. 33 (1980) [hereinafter
Women's Convention].
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The application of human rights principles to women, including repro-
ductive rights, is even slower in its realization. The political and civil liber-
ties defined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights prohibits
distinctions made on the basis, among others, of "sex."74 Among the basic
rights protected in this document are the right to "life, liberty, and security
of person"75 and freedom from "torture"76 or "cruel, inhuman or degrad-
ing treatment or punishment."77 The International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (Political Covenant) protects the "right of self-determina-
tion."78 It also reiterates rights designated in the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights.79 The Political Covenant also protects the "security of per-
son."80 State regulation of reproductive functions of men, such as involun-
tary castration, have been denounced as violations of fundamental
rights.81 Yet these provisions generally have not been interpreted to apply
to arbitrary and pervasive deprivations suffered uniquely by women
throughout the world.82 In particular, although each of these rights
encompasses the right to self-determination in reproductive decisions,8 3 it
was not until the adoption of the Women's Convention that the association
between human rights and reproductive self-determination was made.
The linkage between human rights norms and reproductive choices is
complicated by limiting legal interpretations of culpable state action.
Human rights violations resulting from direct state action are the classic
political and civil rights protected by international law.8 4 To the extent
that reproductive rights violations result from direct intrusions by the
State, such as coerced abortion, they are more likely to be accepted as
human rights violations. But where reproductive self-determination for
74. Universal Declaration, supra note 67, art. 2.
75. Id. art. 3.
76. Id. art. 5.
77. Id.
78. Political Covenant, supra note 70, art. 1(1).
79. Article 7 provides that "No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman
or degrading treatment or punishment." Id. art. 7.
80. Id. art. 9(1).
81. E.g., Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942). India's forced sterilization
of men in the 1970s resulted in international outrage. As a result, the government
shifted its program to focus on "what it considers its simplest and surest method of
population control: sterilization of women." Molly Moore, Teeming India Engulfed by
Soaring Birthrate, WASH. PosT, Aug 21, 1994, at Al, A32. Ninety-seven percent of all
sterilizations in India are now performed on women, despite the fact that male vasecto-
mies are simpler and safer operations than female tubal ligations. Id.
82. See Hilary Charlesworth, What are "Women's International Human Rights?," in
HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN 58, 71-72 (Rebecca J. Cook ed., 1994) (characterizing the
most common deprivations: unsafe abortions, maternal morbidity, infanticide of girl
babies, malnutrition from favoring males with available food, and continuous violence
against women).
83. See Berta E. Hernindez, To Bear or Not to Bear: Reproductive Freedom as an Inter-
national Human Right, 17 BROOIK J. hr'tL L. 309 (1991) (arguing that international reso-
lutions, and declarations of the United Nations and other international groups
acknowledge that reproductive self-determination is an individual right).
84. See Rebecca J. Cook, Human Rights and Reproductive Self-Determination, 44 AM.
U. L. Rav. 975, 989 (1995).
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women is denied because of pervasive cultural or religious discrimination
against women, it is less likely to be perceived as state action denying
human rights. In international law, as in domestic law, actions relegated to
the "private" sphere are considered beyond the scope of human rights law,
which addresses only "public" state action. This interpretation ignores the
systematic marginalization of women into the "private" sphere.85 Pervasive
violence against women, extending from private sphere violence to the
aficient-and still prevalent-practice of rape during war, may be inter-
preted as outside the scope of the basic international human rights
documents.86
This public/private distinction does not completely explain past fail-
ures to recognize reproductive self-determination as a civil or political
human right. Clearly, in some countries, there is state action in regard to
unsafe contraception which may constitute impermissible state-sponsored
or endorsed medical experimentation without consent. Coercive reproduc-
tive policies, whether they include compelled sterilization and abortion or
compelled parenthood, are violations of liberty, security of person, self-
determination, and in some cases life, as completely as the classically
accepted human rights violations.8 7 But the harms suffered specifically by
85. One commentator argues that States can be held responsible for systematic "pri-
vate" violence against women under two theories. The State's failure to provide legal
protection for women from private actors makes the State a party to denial of life, lib-
erty, and security. Alternatively, the State's failure to prohibit and punish violence
against women denies women the equal protection of the law. See Celina Romany, State
Responsibility Goes Private: A Feminist Critique of the Public/Private Distinction in Inter-
national Human Rights Law,' in HumANs RIGHTS OF WoMEN, 85, 99-102 (Rebecca J. Cook
ed., 1994).
86. See Charlesworth, supra note 82, at 72. Charlesworth cites an example of
research done in Brazil which found that the defense of "honor" was successful, when
invoked, in some regions in 80% of the cases of murder of an allegedly unfaithful wife
by her husband. Id. Husband-murder was viewed as a more serious crime. Id. Simi-
larly, the rape of women held in detention historically has been considered a private act
and only recently addressed in human rights dialogue. Joan Fitzpatrick, The Use of
International Human Rights Norms to Combat Violence Against Women, in HuMAN RIGHTS
OF WOMEN 532, 544 (RebeccaJ. Cook ed., 1994). It is only recently that some countries
have begun to recognize the systematic rape of women during war as a basis for seeking
political asylum. SeeJan Burgess, New UNHCR Guidelines for Protection of Women, REmu-
GEES, Oct. 1991, at 40.
The Draft Declaration on Violence Against Women is a start at addressing some of
these problems. See Monitoring the Implementation of the Naivoni Forward-Looking Strate-
gies for the Advancement of Women, Draft Declaration on Violence Against Women, United
Nations, Economic and Social Council, 36th Sess., Provisional Agenda Item 4, app., at
11, U.N. Doc. E/CN.6/1992/4 (1991). The Geneva Convention of 1949 specifically pro-
hibits attacks against the "honour" of civilian women, "in particular against rape,
enforced prostitution, or any form of indecent assault." Geneva Convention Relative to
the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 27, 6 U.S.T. 3517,
75 U.N.T.S. 287. The problem is not the lack of protective legal norms but the failure of
governments to place a priority on these protections.
87. Other examples include violation of equality rights where men, rather than
women, make the decisions about whether to reproduce, violation of life through unsafe
health practices relating to reproduction, loss of liberty, and self-determination by
denial of contraception, genital mutilation, rape, and other violence against women. See
Cook, supra note 84, at 993-1013. Professor Cook categorizes human rights violations
Cornell International Law Journal
women have for the most part been excluded from the theoretical formula-
tion of human rights. As a result, international law has failed to perceive
what is for women a basic interpretation of existing rights: reproductive
self-determination is synonymous with liberty.88 Clearly, denial of repro-
ductive self-determination for a woman is at least as powerful a deprivation
of liberty as denial of "thought, conscience and religion,"8 9 "vote,"90 and
"liberty of movement and freedom to choose... residence," 91 all examples
of classic civil and political liberties protected by international agreements.
Article 17 of the Political Covenant highlights this dichotomy by providing
that "No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with
his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on
his honour and reputation."92 The language of this provision reinforces
the suspicion that the drafters and ratifiers of these documents were not
thinking of women when they defined human rights.93
The harm from failure to incorporate women's perspectives in the
articulation of human rights is compounded in many countries by the low
value placed on women's needs. The status accorded women in many soci-
eties results in States' failure to perceive violations of reproductive auton-
omy as violations of rights classically defined by reference to men's
experiences. Thus, States fail to equate reproductive autonomy with the
rights of "security of person" and "self-determination," even though they
are equivalent protections. Even where legal norms are clear, gender bias
may result in lack of enforcement.
Human rights relating to women and reproduction have historically
been classified as social and economic rights. While social and economic
rights are protected throughout numerous human rights documents, they
have been deemed less universally credible and therefore less important
internationally than classic civil and political rights.94 As a result, the
international enforcement mechanisms, both for women's rights and social
in three classes: (1) violations resulting from direct state action, (2) violations resulting
from a State's failure to protect minimum obligations of human rights, and (3) viola-
tions relating to a pattern of discriminatory practices. Id. at 989. Violations of repro-
ductive rights can occur throughout the three categories.
88. Rebecca Cook defines the reproductive interests that implicate international
human rights protections as: reproductive security and sexuality, reproductive health,
reproductive equality, and reproductive decision-making. Id. at 979.
89. Political Covenant, supra note 70, art. 18(1).
90. Id. art. 25.
91. Id. art. 12(1).
92. Id. art. 17(1) (emphasis added).
93. Katharine Bartlett argues that legal analysis must begin by "asking the woman
question," that is, asking whether the law takes into account women's experiences and
values. This approach challenges the assumption that a law is derived from gender-
neutral principles. See Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HAlv. L. Rv.
829, 837 (1990).
94. See Hendriks, supra note 25, at 1130. The controversy centers on disputes about
"negative" and "positive" rights. Since most social rights impose affirmative obligations
upon States, they are at odds with the Western, particularly the U.S., interpretation of
rights as negative, that is, the right to be free from State interference in certain matters.
See id. at 1133.
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and economic rights, are less effective than those established for violations
of civil and political rights.95
III. Development of International Women's Rights
The development of women's international human rights began with the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, which prohibits discrimi-
nation on the basis of sex.96 Numerous subsequent treaties include simi-
lar protections.9 7 In addition, commentators have argued that prohibition
of gender discrimination is a principle of customary international law.98
The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women (Women's Convention) creates the international legal standard for
protection against gender discrimination.99 It is premised on the recogni-
tion that legal, social, political, cultural, and economic norms are perme-
ated by gender discrimination. 100 The Preamble expresses the concern
that, despite numerous international treaties promoting equality, extensive
discrimination exists. The Women's Convention defines "discrimination
against women" as
any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex which has
the effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment,
or exercise by women, irrespective of their marital status, on a basis of
equality of men and women, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in
95. The only enforcement mechanism currently available under both the Women's
Convention and the Economic Convention is self-reporting. See Economic Covenant,
supra note 70, art. 16; Women's Convention, supra note 73, art. 18.
96. Universal Declaration, supra note 67, art. 2.
97. Political Covenant, supra note 70, art. 14(1) ("All persons shall be equal before
the courts and tribunals."); id. art. 2(1) ("Each State Party... undertakes to respect and
to ensure... rights ... without distinction of any kind, such as ... sex."). The Eco-
nomic Covenant requires States to guarantee economic and social rights and opportuni-
ties. Economic Covenant, supra note 70, art. 2. Article 3 specifically requires States "to
ensure the equal right of men and women to the enjoyment of all economic, social and
cultural rights set forth in the present Covenant." Id art. 3.
98. Customary international law binds a State that has not ratified an agreement on
the issue. Customary law is defined as law which "results from a general and consistent
practice of states followed by them from a sense of legal obligation." RESTATEMENT
(TimRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw OF Tm UNITED STATES § 102(2) (1987). "A state
violates international law if... it practices, encourages, or condones... a consistent
pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights." Id. § 702(g).
Equality of women is a generally accepted human right. See id. § 701. See LAN BROWN-
LIE, STATE RESPONSIBILY 81 (1983) (concluding that the principle of non-discrimination
on the basis of gender is now firmly established as customary international law).
99. Women's Convention, supra note 73.
100. Article 2 requires States "[t]o take all appropriate measures, including legisla-
tion, to modify or abolish existing laws, regulations, customs and practices which con-
stitute discrimination against women[.]" Id art 2(f). Article 7 requires States Parties to
eliminate discrimination against women in their access to the political process. Id. art.
7. Other emphasized areas include: nationality rights, id. art. 9; education, id. art. 10;
employment, particularly as it relates to discrimination on the basis of pregnancy, id.
art. 11; health care, id. art. 12; rural women, id. art. 14; legal capacity, id. art. 15; and
marriage and family, id. art. 16. As of March 21, 1996, 152 countries are party to the
Women's Convention. U.N. Treaty Data Base, Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the
Secretary-General, http://www.un.org./Depts/Treaty (March 21, 1996).
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the political, economic, social, cultural, civil, or any other field.10 1
Article 2 requires States to take all legal and "appropriate means and with-
out delay" to "ensure" the realization of the "principle of the equality of
men and women" and to "eliminate discrimination against women."1 0 2
The Women's Convention reflects a strong understanding of the com-
plex and pervasive nature of gender discrimination within a society. It
imposes responsibility to change not only the laws but also the underlying
traditions and practices which are often more powerful forces within a soci-
ety than legal regulation. In essence, the Women's Convention is intended
to reach not only public but private conduct that perpetuates discrimina-
tion against women. 10 3 Article 2(e) requires States "[tjo take all appropri-
ate measures to eliminate discrimination against women by any person,
organization or enterprise[.] " 10 4 Article 2() specifically requires States
"[t]o take all appropriate measures, including legislation, to modify or
abolish existing laws, regulations, customs and practices which constitute
discrimination against women[.]"' 0 5 Article 5(a) imposes a duty on States
"[t]o modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and
women, with a view to achieving the elimination of prejudices and custom-
ary and all other practices which are based on the idea of the inferiority or
the superiority of either of the sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and
women[.]" 10 6 Article 10 requires "[t]he elimination of any stereotyped
concept of the roles of men and women at all levels and in all forms of
education .... o107 Article 17 establishes the Committee on the Elimina-
tion of Discrimination Against Women which is charged with monitoring
compliance.
International documents subsequent to the Women's Convention also
recognize freedom from discrimination against women and gender equal-
ity as basic human rights.10 8 Despite the foundation established for recog-
nition of women's rights through myriad international documents,
101. Women's Convention, supra note 73, art. 1. By relying upon distinctions "made
on the basis of sex," Article 1 reaches only those laws which are discriminatory on their
face. Gender neutral laws which may have discriminatory impact do not violate Article
1. They do violate other provisions. See, e.g., id., art. 5(a) (parties should modify social
and cultural patterns of conduct); id. art. 10 (equal educational opportunities and
access).
102. Id. art. 2.
103. This is the principal perceived difference between the protection of the Women's
Convention and the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which also prohibits gender
discrimination. See Political Convenant, supra note 70, art. 26.
104. Women's Convention, supra note 73, art. 2(e).
105. Id. art. 2(f).
106. Id. art. 5(a).
107. Id. art. 10(c).
108. See, e.g., Fourth Review and Appraisal of the World Population Plan of Action,
Review and Appraisal of Progress Made Towards the Implementation of the World Popula-
tion Plan of Action, United Nations, Preparatory Committee for the International Confer-
ence on Population and Development, 3d Sess., Provisional Agenda Item 4, U.N. Doc. A/
CONF.171/PC/3 (1994). Paragraph 18 of the Vienna Declaration and Programme of
Action, the product of the 1993 World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna,
provides:
Vol. 29
1996 Reservations About Women
improvement in women's status has proved to be "much slower than
expected" and has in fact deteriorated in many developing countries since
the adoption of the Women's Convention.' 0 9 Although many countries
took positive action to remove legal discrimination, the source of pervasive
and continuing gender discrimination lies in the traditions and practices
which control social relationships.110
These traditions conflict with the very essence of the Women's Con-
vention. Article 28(2) prohibits reservations "incompatible with the object
and purpose" of the document.'11 Of the 152 States party to the Conven-
tion, approximately one-third have made substantive reservations, making
the Women's Convention one of the most reserved international human
rights documents.112 The most sweeping reservations were entered by
Muslim countries which claimed that provisions of the Women's Conven-
tion conflicted with the Shari'a (Islamic law). 113 Bangladesh's reservation,
for example, reads in part "The Government of the People's Republic of
Bangladesh does not consider as binding upon itself the provisions of [Arti-
cle 2] as [it] conflict[s] with Sharia Law based on Holy Quran and
Sunna."" 4 Article 2 of the Women's Convention is the heart of the treaty,
for it includes the requirement that States agree to use all appropriate
means to eliminate discrimination in laws or tradition-based practices. 115
It seems doubtful that a country that objects to Article 2 could be said in
The human rights of women and of the girl-child are an inalienable, integral and
indivisible part of human rights. The full and equal participation of women in
political, civil, economic, social and cultural life, at the national, regional and
international levels, and the eradication of all forms of discrimination on
grounds of sex are priority objectives of the international community.
Report of the World Conference on Human Rights, Vienna Declaration and Programme of
Action, United Nations, World Conference on Human Rights, at 20, para. 1(18), U.N.
Doc. A/CONF.157/24 (1993), reprinted in 32 LL.M. 1661 (1993) [hereinafter Vienna
Declaration]. The Vienna Declaration further calls for the elimination of gender-based
violence, sexual harassment, and expioitation. Improvement in "safe maternity and
health care" are two of the designated areas of focus for legal change and -national
action and international cooperation." Id.
109. Fourth Review, supra note 44, para. 49.
110. See id. paras. 49-50.
111. Women's Convention, supra note 73, art. 28(2). This language is consistent with
the restrictions on reservations found throughout international law. See REsTATEmENT
(THImD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw OF THE UNrr=n STATES § 313 cmt. b (1987).
112. Belinda Clark, The Vienna Convention Reservations Regime and the Convention on
Discrimination Against Women, 85 Am. J. INT'L L. 281, 282-83 (1991). Over forty coun-
tries have made substantive reservations. This is a significant number of reservations for
a treaty although other human rights treaties tend to have large numbers of reservations.
Id. at 283. The United States has not yet ratified the Women's Convention.
113. These countries include Bangladesh, Libya, Egypt, and Iraq. See id. at 284 (not-
ing reservations by Bangladesh and Egypt).
114. Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary General, United Nations, at 171,
U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.E/8 (1990). Egypt entered a reservation to Article 2 to the
extent it was inconsistent with the Shari'a. Id. at 173. Iraq entered reservations to Arti-
cles 2(f) and (g) without explanation. See id. at 174. Bangladesh also has entered reser-
vations to Articles 13(a), 16(1)(c), and 16(1)(f). Id. at 171.
115. See supra text accompanying note 102.
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any meaningful way to comply with the Convention. 116
Some of the reservations reflect profound disagreement with the
meaning of "discrimination." Several countries entered reservations to
Article 16, which protects women's rights in the family and in family plan-
ning. Iraq and Egypt's objection to Article 16 is premised on equivalent
rights in marriage under Shari'a. While the argument has been made that
Shari'a is more favorable to women than the Women's Convention, in real-
ity the assignment of "equal" responsibilities in marriage perpetuates ste-
reotypes. 117 Women's responsibilities are inevitably domestic, without
economic value, whereas men are assigned the political and economic lead-
ership roles. This very concept of "separate but equal" is incompatible
with the Women's Convention, which requires equal social and economic
opportunities.'1 8
Numerous other countries entered substantive reservations derived
from conflicts between the rights protected in the Women's Convention
and their cultural norms. 119 Malawi, for example, entered a reservation
stating that, "'owing to the deep-rooted nature of some traditional customs
and practices' the Government did not, 'for the time being, consider itself
bound by such of the provisions of the Convention as require immediate
eradication of such traditional customs and practices." 120 South Korea
entered numerous reservations to women's rights within the family based
on traditional practices.' 2 '
These reservations are incompatible with the object and purpose of
the Convention. 122 Where cultural and religious norms perpetuate system-
116. Numerous countries objected to these reservations under Article 28(2), which
prohibits reservations incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty. See Clark,
supra note 112, at 283-87. Denmark and Norway objected to a reservation by Libya
claiming that, since a state may not use internal law to justify a failure to perform a
treaty, religious law similarly should not excuse performance. See Donna J. Sullivan,
Gender Equality and Religious Freedom: Toward a Framework for Conflict Resolution, 24
N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & PoL 795, 807 n.32 (1992). Compare these reservations to the reser-
vations favoring male succession to the monarchy made by Belgium, Spain, the United
Kingdom, and Luxembourg, which have limited impact on the lives of women in these
countries.
117. Clark, supra note 112, at 300 (claiming Shari'a is more favorable in this area).
118. See Rebecca J. Cook, Reservations to the Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 30 VA. J. INT'L' L. 643, 705 (1990); Sullivan,
supra note 116, at 844-45.
119. India ratified the Women's Convention without reservation but made declara-
tions concerning Articles 5(a) and 16(1) that assert a policy of governmental non-inter-
ference in practices of religious and ethnic minorities. RIcHARD B. LILLICH,
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INsTRuMurrs 220.19 (2d ed. 1990). This policy will allow
certain discriminatory religious laws to continue.
120. Clark, supra note 112, at 300 (citing U.N. Doc. C.N.78.1987.TREATIES-3(IV.8)).
Tunisia's reservation centered on conflicts between the Women's Convention and its
Constitution. Id. at 301.
121. See generally Rosa Kim, The Legacy of Institutionalized Gender Inequality in South
Korea: The Family Law, 14 B.C. THiRD WORLD LJ. 145, 158 (1994); Cook, supra note
118, at 694.
122. See Clark, supra note 112, at 299;Julie A. Minor, Recent Developments, An Analy-
sis of Structural Weaknesses in the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimi-
nation Against Women, 24 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 137, 144 (1994); AnnaJenefsky, Note,
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atic discrimination against women, reservations based on these norms
undermine the principles of gender equality required by the Women's Con-
vention. Reliance on religious and cultural traditions to deny human rights
to women is a profoundly troubling dynamic because it offers no expecta-
tion or opportunity for enhancement of women's status. More importantly,
international acquiescence validates the moral authority of traditions
inconsistent with rights for women.
There are several articles in the Women's Convention which specifi-
cally address reproductive rights and health. Article 10(h) guarantees
"[a]ccess to specific educational information to help ensure the health and
well-being of families, including information and advice on family plan-
ning."123 Article 11(1)(0 guarantees "[tihe right to protection of health
and to safety in working conditions, including the safeguarding of the func-
tion of reproduction."124 Article 11 also requires States to prohibit dis-
crimination based on pregnancy or maternity leave, to "encourage" the
provision of adequate social services, such as child-care, to assist working
parents, and to provide special protection to women from harmful work
during pregnancy. 125 Article 12 requires States to eliminate discrimina-
tion with regard to access to health care, including family planning and to
ensure appropriate health care during pregnancy, childbirth, and the post-
natal period, including adequate nutrition and "free services where neces-
sary[.]" 126 Article 14, in addressing the special problems of rural women,
guarantees access to adequate health care, "including information, counsel-
ling and services in family planning[.] " 127
Article 16 of the Women's Convention, establishing rights of women
within the family, is intended to eliminate both public and private discrimi-
nation. Article 16 explicitly establishes a right of reproductive autonomy:
States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to... ensure, on a basis of
equality of men and women . . . [t]he same rights to decide freely and
responsibly on the number and spacing of their children and to have access
to the information, education and means to enable them to exercise these
rights[.]128
Article 16 uses language similar to the Bucharest World Population Plan of
Action. In accordance with the rest of the Women's Convention, the theo-
retical basis for this language is specifically grounded in an explicit recog-
nition that for women, reproductive self-determination is essential for the
meaningful exercise of other rights.'129
Permissibility of Egypt's Reservations to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women, 15 MD. J. INT'L L. & TRADE 199 (1991).
123. Women's Convention, supra note 73, art. 10(h).
124. Id. art. 11(1)(0.
125. Id. art. 11(2)(a)-(d).
126. Id. art. 12.
127. Id. art. 14(2)(b).
128. Id. art. 16(1), (1)(e).
129. Freedman & Isaacs, supra note 25, at 23.
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The Women's Convention's strong language of equality and autonomy
is a valuable articulation of principles. In this regard, the treaty rates high
as an educational and political tool. The enforcement value of the treaty is
marginal, however. Some of the weaknesses of the Women's Convention
are highlighted by comparison to the International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD), the model for
the Women's Convention.130 CERD includes both a complaint process for
alleged violations and a mechanism for determining if reservations are
incompatible with the purposes of the treaty.131 The Women's Convention
lacks both.132 The recent Beijing Conference on Women called for action
to ensure that no reservations to the Women's Convention are incompati-
ble with either that document or with other international treaties.133 The
Beijing Declaration also recommended adoption of an optional Protocol
which would allow individual enforcement against other state parties by
citizens of the state or by other states. 134
IV. Human Rights and Population Planning
Although the World Population Plans of Action since Bucharest have
included language recognizing reproductive rights of individuals, the effi-
cacy of these protections is not apparent. 135 The late recognition by the
international community of the human rights issues in population pro-
grams continues to hinder enforcement of these rights. The significant her-
itage of Malthusian theory in population programs results in policies
where achievement of fertility reduction is top priority.136 Indeed, because
130. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimina-
tion, opened for signature Dec. 21, 1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 212 [hereinafter CERD].
131. Id. arts. 11-14, 20.
132. See Women's Convention, supra note 73.
133. Draft Platform of Action, U.N. Commission on the Status of Women, paras.
230(c)-(d), U.N. Doc. A/CONF/177L 124, available at http://www.igc.apc.org/women-
snet/ beijing/beijing.htnl (1995) [hereinafter Beijing Declaration].
134. Id. para. 230(l).
135. The World Population Plan of Action is a consensus document without binding
legal obligations. It is reviewed and revised periodically at U.N. sponsored conferences,
such as the conferences in Teheran and Mexico City. Its value, as with other consensus
documents such as the Vienna Declaration and Beijing Declaration, is in articulating
international principles which can be used nationally as both blueprint and ammuni-
tion for legal and social change. International financial assistance may also be linked to
acceptance and implementation of principles delineated in consensus documents.
136. For example, Bangladesh reduced its fertility rates from seven births per woman
to under five between 1975 and 1990 through use of an "aggressive" contraception pro-
gram without a corresponding reduction in the high death rate in the country. Men or
women who agreed to be sterilized received the equivalent of several weeks wages, access
to emergency wheat, and other forms of payment. Government personnel were penal-
ized if they failed to meet sterilization quotas. As might be expected, it is primarily the
poor who are sterilized. See I-ITmANN, supra note 30, at 223-41.
Robey et al. claim that fertility rates can be reduced even in the absence of improve-
ment of the quality of life through strong contraception programs and the "educational
power of mass media." Robey et al., supra note 14, at 60. Using data compiled through
surveys of over 300,000 women in developing countries, the authors claim that the pres-
ence of these factors allows'the developing countries to reduce their birth rates without
Vol. 29
1996 Reservations About Women
population policy assumes state regulation, direct or indirect, of reproduc-
tive behavior, the very concept of a population program may be inconsis-
tent with reproductive self-determination.
The aggressive anti-natalist policy of China is one of the most extreme
modem examples. Coercion, both direct and indirect, is the cornerstone of
China's "one-child policy." Couples are subject to significant community
pressures to comply with the one-child mandate. Forced contraception,
abortion, and sterilization may occur.137 Government penalties concern-
ing medical, educational, and housing benefits are imposed upon those
individuals who fail to comply.138
More typical are the abuses which occur in numerous countries in the
distribution of contraceptives. The health risks accompanying most forms
of contraception have too often been ignored by dispensers of family plan-
ning programs. As a result, failure to consider the medical profile of each
contraceptive user, and failure to obtain informed consent are two of the
most common abuses which occur in family planning programs. Family
planning personnel, who are often required to solicit "acceptors" for family
planning, obviously have little incentive or technical capability to fully
investigate the appropriateness of a particular contraceptive for each indi-
vidual.' 39 In addition, it is often the husband who purchases the contra-
ceptives and explains the process to his wife, thereby attenuating the
connection to the woman's health even further. 14° Concerns with distribu-
tion of birth controls pills, IUDs, and injectable contraceptives such as
Depo-Provera surface repeatedly in the assessment of family planning
programs. 141
The latest controversy involves the use of Norplant, which was widely
heralded by many in the population community as the perfect contracep-
tive: long-acting, reversible, and not dependent upon regular individual
responsibility for its use.142 But Norplant implantation and removal
waiting for economic growth to effect demographic change through improved health,
education, and employment opportunities. The authors' research leads them to con-
clude that strong family planning programs which increase use of contraception are the
single most important factor in reducing the birth rate. Id. at 65. Voluntary female
sterilization emerged as the most common method of contraception. Id. at 63.
The authors therefore dispute that "development is the best contraceptive." However
they use Bangladesh as one example of a success story in reduction of fertility rates
without any consideration of the human rights implications of the methods employed to
assure contraception use.
137. Boland, Population Policies, supra note 27, at 1260-61.
138. Id. at 1261.
139. HA-gmANN, supra note 30, at 195.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 189-207; DIXoN-MuELLER, supra note 7, at 209. See AnrudhJain &Judith
Bruce, Quality: The Key to Success, in B-YoND THE NUMBERS 171 (Laurie Ann Mazur ed.,
1994).
142. See HAgRmAN, supra note 30, at 207. Norplant consists of six encapsulated hor-
mones which are inserted under the skin of the arm. Norplant can prevent pregnancy
for approximately five years. The implants can be removed at any time or replaced after
five years. Both insertion and removal require trained personnel capable of applying
local anesthesia. Id. at 207-08.
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requires a medical facility and trained medical personnel because of poten-
tial infection and unpleasant side effects. 143 Abuses associated with Nor-
plant have been documented in Indonesia and other countries, including
the absence of trained personnel, lack of informed consent, unsanitary con-
ditions, and unwillingness of program personnel to remove the drug when
women suffered adverse effects or no longer wanted it. 144
The dynamics of pro-natalist policies may be no less coercive and vio-
lative of rights. In Romania, Nicolae Ceausescu claimed "the fetus is the
socialist property of the whole society. Giving birth is a patriotic duty ....
Those who refuse to have children are deserters, escaping the law of natu-
ral continuity." 145 The Romanian government banned most abortions and
contraception, mandated monthly gynecological examinations in the work-
place, and tracked pregnancies to ensure they were carried to term.' 46
Other countries continue to ban most contraception and abortion for pro-
natalist or religious reasons. 14 7
The Cairo Programme of Action, negotiated by over 180 countries in
1994, explicitly links population policies to international human rights. 148
Reproductive health is designated as an essential right in the development
of population policies which comply with international human rights stan-
dards. 149 The cornerstone of the Cairo Programme is the document's
inclusive definition of reproductive health:
Reproductive health is a state of complete physical, mental and social well-
being and not merely the absence of disease and infirmity, in all matters
relating to the reproductive system and to its functions and processes.
Reproductive health therefore implies that people are able to have a satisfy-
ing and safe sex life and that they have the capability to reproduce and the
freedom to decide if, when and how often to do so. Implicit in this last
condition are the right of men and women to be informed and to have access
to safe, effective, affordable and acceptable methods of family planning of
their choice, as well as other methods of their choice for regulation of fertil-
ity which are not against the law, and the right of access to appropriate
health-care services that will enable women to go safely through pregnancy
and childbirth and provide couples with the best chance of having a healthy
infant. In line with the above definition of reproductive health, reproductive
health care is defined as the constellation of methods, techniques and serv-
ices that contribute to reproductive health and well-being by preventing and
solving reproductive health problems. It also includes sexual health, the
purpose of which is the enhancement of life and personal relations, and not
143. Id. at 209-10.
144. Boland, Population Policies, supra note 27, at 1261-62; HrMmm, supra note 30,
at 73-83, 209-13.
145. Hord et al., supra note 27, at 232.
146. The devastation resulting from these policies included the highest maternal and
infant mortality rates in Europe, over 500 deaths annually due to unsafe abortions,
thousands of women with serious medical complications, and sterility. The toll taken
on many thousands of children included abandonment and institutionalization under
inhumane conditions. Boland, Population Policies, supra note 27, at 1259.
147. Id. at 1260.
148. Cairo Programme, supra note 2, para. 1.15.
149. Id. para. 7.3.
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merely counselling and care related to reproduction and sexually transmit-
ted diseases.15 0
Structuring international family planning maxims on the centerpiece
of reproductive health and self-determination brings into play the myriad
cultural and religious traditions which deny women autonomy, particularly
reproductive autonomy. When this dynamic is coupled with the Malthu-
sian legacy which emphasizes demographic ends rather than means, signif-
icant resistance is likely to a population policy which is built upon
women's reproductive health. The perpetual tension between international
human rights law and the sovereign rights of States is highlighted when a
persistent pattern of action, i.e., discrimination against women, is
pervasive.
Part of the tension derives from the perception that human rights in
international law are the product of a Western philosophical and political
view incompatible with many non-Western cultures.15 1 The definition of
rights as protection of the individual from interference by government is
antithetical to more communally oriented societies.' 5 2 Communally ori-
ented cultures tend to define individual interests in relation to group inter-
ests.15 3 In these societies, individual interests are protected through the
articulation of group values, without the direct adversarial relationship
between individual and government familiar to Western political theory.
Individual rights therefore may be defined in very different terms than in
Western political doctrine. 15 4 As a result of these differing interpretations,
an ongoing debate exists as to the universality of human rights.'5 5 Univer-
sality is disputed by those countries which argue for a qualified universal-
ity, an interpretation of human rights that incorporates cultural and
150. Id. para. 7.2.
151. The concepts of individuality, liberty, equality, and constitutional democracy
originate in Western philosophy, particularly in the works ofJohn Locke andjohn Smart
Mill. Non-Westerners are not the only proponents of this distinction. See Samuel P.
Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations?, FOREIGN An'., Summer 1993, at 22, 40.
Numerous Muslims have claimed that human rights norms, derived fromJudeo-Chris-
tian principles, are inapplicable under Islamic law. See Ann Elizabeth Mayer, Universal
Versus Islamic Human Rights: A Clash of Cultures, or a Clash with a Construct?, 15 MIcH.
J. INT'L L. 307, 315-22 (1994).
152. For example, many Asian societies emphasize the duties of individuals within a
social community. See, e.g., Manwoo Lee, North Korea and the Western Notion of Human
Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN EAsT AsIA A CULTURAL PERSPcrIvE 129, 133 (James C. Hsi-
ung ed., 1985).
153. Two examples are consensual societies, such as Japan and South Korea, which
are based on mutual accommodations, and communist societies, such as China and
North Korea, where individual interests are subsumed to interests defined by the Party.
James C. Hsiung, Human Rights in an East Asian Perspective, in HUMAN RIGHTS iN EAsT
AsIA A CULTURAL PERsPECTrvE 1, 6-17 (James C. Hsiung ed., 1985).
154. The Saudi Arabian Basic Law, promulgated in 1992, recognizes human rights
principles but only so far as they are "in accordance with the Islamic shari'a." Mayer,
supra note 151, at 358.
155. See Donna J. Sullivan, Current Developments, Women's Human Rights and the
1993 World Conference on Human Rights, 88 AMt. J. INT'L L. 152, 157 (1994); Huntington,
supra note 151, at 41.
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religious limitations.156
Qualified universality creates particular problems for women.
Women's rights simply are inconsistent with many cultural traditions
which deny women liberty and equality. Efforts to achieve universality
with regard to women's rights meet with resistance in the name of cultural
relativism. Cultural relativism becomes the justification for perpetuating
systematic discrimination against women.
This conflict emerged as a central theme at the second World Confer-
ence on Human Rights held in Vienna in 1993. The United States, as a
proponent of the universality principle, argued that "[w]e cannot let cul-
tural relativism become the last refuge of repression."15 7 Numerous devel-
oping countries, including Iran, Syria, Indonesia, China, Cuba, Vietnam,
Singapore, Malaysia, Pakistan, and Yemen, argued against universality.' 5 8
The argument for cultural relativism asks too much. Certainly, respect for
non-Western cultural distinctions must be incorporated into interpretation
of human rights. At the same time, systematic patterns of discrimination
cannot be accepted in the name of cultural relativism. To do so negates
any principled definition of human rights.
In many non-Western societies, cultural traditions define the role of
the individual within the socio-political structure. The concept of individ-
ual rights conflicts with strictly delineated roles entrenched for hundreds,
if not thousands, of years. These traditional roles tend to disadvantage
women who historically have been denied the status, rights, and opportu-
nities granted to men.-59 In addition, because the Western principle of
separation of church and state is not an international norm and bears little
relevance in non-Western societies, religious doctrines that define women
by their reproductive roles may be directly incorporated into cultural and
legal restrictions. 160 In these societies, assertion of women's individual
156. See Mayer, supra note 151, at 316-22; Rebecca J. Cook, Women's International
Human Rights Law: The Way Forward, in HumA' RIGHTS OF WOMEN 3, 7 (RebeccaJ. Cook
ed., 1994).
157. Elaine Sciolino, U.S. Rejects Notion That Human Rights Vary With Culture, N.Y.
TIMEs, June 15, 1993, at Al.
158. Roger Thurow, U.N. Conference Plagued by Demands That Rights Must Bow to
National Goals, WALL ST. J., June 25, 1993, at A6. Some of these countries objected to
universality on principles other than tradition, such as China, which has repeatedly
asserted that human rights are internal affairs to be defined by the sovereign state. Chi-
nese communist political theory also subordinates the interests of the individual to those
of the state.
Not all non-Western leaders argued against universality. The Dalai Lama argued fer-
vendy for "freedom, equality and dignity" for all. Raymond Whitaker, Vienna Gives
Dalai Lama a Hero's Welcome, THE INDEPENDENT (London), June 16, 1993, at 12.
159. For example, under Shari'a, a man may marry up to four wives and divorce them
at will. A woman is allowed only one husband and may divorce only in very limited and
restricted circumstances. See Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im, Islam, Islamic Law and the
Dilemma of Cultural Legitimacy for Universal Human Rights, in AsiAN PERSPECTIVES ON
HUMAN RIGHTS 31, 38 (Claude E. Welch, Jr. & Virginia A. Leary eds., 1990).
160. See Anika Rahman, Note, Religious Rights Versus Women's Rights in India: A Test
Case for International Human Rights Law, 28 COLUM. J. TRNSNAT'L L. 473, 473-74
(1990); Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im, State Responsibility Under International Human
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rights is perceived as violative of the established social and religious
order.161
The real source of tension in the recognition of women's reproductive
rights is therefore more deeply embedded than conflicts in political theory.
Traditional social structures, often religiously based and asserted as the
sovereign imperative of many countries, in fact mask the continuation of
the systematic disadvantage imposed upon women. Control over women
by fathers, husbands, and the state is perpetuated in the name of sovereign
authority. For example, although some Islamic laws may be interpreted to
support the use of contraceptives and family planning, other Islamic laws
denying women equality within the marriage relationship make it unlikely
that a woman could exercise reproductive self-determination. 162 The rise
of fundamentalist religious political power has exacerbated these issues, by
combining a restrictive view of women with distrust for Western influ-
ences. One fundamentalist commentator criticized the Cairo Convention,
charging that the provisions protecting reproductive self-determination
promote extramarital sex which, in turn, causes moral decline, disease,
and crime. He concluded:
Does the UN Draft Programme then want to export these western social mal-
adies to the Eastern and Muslim countries in the name of population control
and development? As far as Bangladesh is concerned these offending
clauses ... offend our religious feelings, our culture and above all our civili-
zation.., to agree to such a proposal would be... unconstitutional.163
At the Cairo Convention, Muslim fundamentalists joined with the Vatican
to challenge provisions protecting women's reproductive health and auton-
omy. 16 4 These challenges were grounded in a valuation of woman as
"mother," which allows for little, if any, consideration of reproductive self-
determination. 165
Rights Law to Change Religious and Customary Laws, in HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN 167,
176 (Rebecca J. Cook ed., 1994); Amin & Hossain, supra note 8, at 1335.
161. The 1990 Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam, issued by the Organiza-
tion of the Islamic Conference, carefully purports to guarantee equal "human dignity" to
women, but the only rights guaranteed to women are (1) the right to enjoy legal person-
ality, (2) the right to own and manage property, and (3) the right to retain name and
lineage. Otherwise, the document preserves the marital dominance of husband over
wife, including the husband's right to demand obedience from his wife. See Mayer,
supra note 151, at 331.
162. Amin & Hossain, supra note 8, at 1333-35.
163. Id. at 1337-38 (citing Abdur Razzaq, Keynote Paper Presented at the Seminar on
the Cairo Conference on Population and Development: Human Rights and Moral Issues
6, 8 (Sept. 9, 1994)).
164. See Mona Zulficar, From Human Rights to Program Reality: Vienna, Cairo, and
Beijing in Perspective, 44 Am. U. L. REv. 1017, 1025 (1995) (noting that the Vatican and
certain Islamic groups opposed language recognizing single-parent households and the
right of adolescents to family planning services and sex education).
165. In some Islamic countries, women-particularly single women-perceived as vio-
lating cultural roles have been accused of adultery or fornication and subjected to hei-
nous punishments, including stoning, caning, and, once, burning at the stake. Amin &
Hossain, supra note 8, at 1340.
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Efforts to justify discriminatory policies in the name of tradition high-
light the fallacy of relying upon cultural relativism to interpret human
rights. These traditions were developed without the participation of
women. If a large segment of society-women-resists the imposition of
these traditions, or were foreclosed from participation in their develop-
ment, the traditions lose their moral authority as cultural imperatives.
They instead reflect denials of individual liberty and discrimination against
a class, which are clear violations of international law. International law
should not accommodate traditional norms which result in the systematic
disadvantage of a segment of society. The pervasive character of this type
of disadvantage presents a harm significantly greater than isolated tradi-
tional practices which may not accord with international maxims. 166
Tensions and ambivalence about women's self-determination are
reflected in the 1993 Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, 167 the
final conference document which, overall, is strongly protective of women's
rights. The Vienna Declaration reaffirms the universality of human rights
by averring that "The universal nature of these rights and freedoms is
beyond question." 168 Universality of human rights is explicitly empha-
sized numerous times in the document.169 Paragraph 1(5) rejects cultural
relativism as a means of interpreting human rights: "While the signifi-
cance of national and regional particularities and various historical, cul-
tural and religious backgrounds must be borne in mind, it is the duty of
States, regardless of their political, economic and cultural systems, to pro-
mote and protect all human rights and fundamental freedoms." 170 At the
same time, the document equivocates on universality by asking States "to
take all appropriate measures in compliance with their international obli-
gations and with due regard to their respective legal systems to counter
intolerance and related violence ... including practices of discrimination
against women .. ."171
Most significantly, the Vienna Declaration recognizes that gender-
based discrimination and violence are violations of "mainstream" human
rights. Paragraph 1(18) of the Declaration provides that "[t]he human
rights of women and of the girl-child are an inalienable, integral and indi-
visible part of universal human rights .... [T]he eradication of all forms of
discrimination on grounds of sex are priority objectives of the interna-
tional community." 172 This language is intended to remove the perception
that international women's rights are in a "special," and therefore inferior,
category. The Declaration calls for "eradication of all forms of discrimina-
tion against women, both hidden and overt." 173 The Declaration further
166. Not surprisingly, women's groups at the Vienna Conference rejected cultural
relativism in interpreting human rights. Sullivan, supra note 155, at 157.
167. Vienna Declaration, supra note 108.
168. Id. para. 1(1).
169. See, e.g., id. pmbl. Id. paras. 1(5), 1(6), 1(8), 1(18), 1(32), 1(34).
170. Id. para. 1(5).
171. Id. para. 11(22).
172. Id. para. 1(18).
173. Id. para. II(39).
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emphasizes that "[glender-based violence and all forms of sexual harass-
ment and exploitation, including those resulting from cultural prejudice
... are incompatible with the dignity and worth of the human person, and
must be eliminated." 174 The right to adequate and accessible health care
and family planning services is specifically protected.175
The Vienna Declaration specifically calls for "the elimination of gen-
der bias in the administration of justice and the eradication of any conflicts
which may arise between the rights of women and the harmful effects of
certain traditional or customary practices, cultural prejudices and religious
extremism." 176 The choice of the word "conflicts" creates some ambiguity
because it mistakenly assumes that women in restrictive societies have suf-
ficient power to create a "conflict." Indeed, the struggle to recognize
women's rights is reflected throughout the document. For while it affirms
women's rights as human rights, the document repeatedly emphasizes free-
dom from gender-based discrimination and violence as human rights, with
recurring references to the need for government action to protect women's
rights. 177
The relationship between cultural relativism and religious doctrine
raises the potential of conflicts between women's rights and religious free-
dom. Freedom of religion is protected by numerous international human
rights documents. 178 Violations of gender equality in the name of reli-
gious freedom create some of the most intractable human rights conflicts.
A state may not use religious law to justify violations of international
human rights. 179 Further, limitations clauses in international human
rights documents allow restrictions on religious beliefs or practices where
"necessary to protect . . . the fundamental rights and freedoms of
others."180 The conflict therefore lies not in the lack of protective language
in human rights documents, but in the ambiguity associated with princi-
ples of equality and self-determination for women.
The traditional cultural roles of wife and mother bring with them
attendant political, social, and economic disabilities. It is not surprising
174. Id. para. 1(18).
175. Id. para. 11(41).
176. Id. para. 11(38).
177. The document urges ratification of the Convention on the Elimination of Dis-
crimination Against Women and encourages action against the large number of reserva-
tions. Id. para. 11(39). The Declaration "urges" governments "to intensify their efforts
for the protection and promotion of human rights of women and the girl-child." Id.
para. 1(18).
178. E.g., Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimina-
tion Based on Religion or Belief, G.A. Res. 36/55, U.N. GAOR, 36th Sess., Supp. No. 51, at
171, U.N. Doc. A/36/51 (1982); CERD, supra note 130, art. 5(d)(vii); Universal Declara-
tion, supra note 67, art. 18.
179. The objections of numerous governments to reservations made to the Women's
Conventions because of conflict with Shari'a are representative. Many countries argued
that these reservations were incompatible with the purpose of the Women's Convention.
Sullivan, supra note 116, at 807.
180. Political Covenant, supra note 70, art. 18(3); Universal Declaration, supra note
67, art. 29(2) (stating that the exercise of rights, including freedom of religion, is limited
by "due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others . ").
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that many reservations to women's rights protected by international law
center on rights of autonomy and equality within the domestic sphere. 18 1
The roles of women in traditional cultures remain bound within the family
structure where the hierarchy of male dominance is unyielding. The legal
systems of many states reinforce the traditional interpretation of women's
roles. Personal status law, derived directly from religious and cultural tra-
ditions, often governs the domestic sphere in areas of marriage, divorce
and maintenance, child custody, and in some cases, inheritance. Thus,
where civil law may define behavior in public life, women are relegated to
the control of men under personal status laws. The result of this control,
in most instances, is exclusion from public life. 18 2 This exclusion occurs
even in some countries where gender equity is protected by law, as a result
of traditions perpetuating gender stereotypes which negate any legal
change in women's status or opportunities.18 3
The exclusion of women from public life highlights the inadequacy of
the law in protecting women's self-determination. The discriminatory con-
duct remains inaccessible to legal norms. This occurs primarily in two
situations. First, where legal norms govern conduct only between the state
and the individual, women may be excluded from interaction with the state
by traditions which relegate women to the private sphere. This can occur
even where the law prohibits gender discrimination. 18 4 Second, even
where the law reaches private sphere conduct, it generally functions to vali-
date the existing power structure of male control under the auspices of
traditional respect for the "family." The extension of human rights princi-
ples into private sphere activity therefore is essential to the protection of
women's self-determination. The Women's Convention incorporates such
an extension of state responsibility. 185 This expansion meets with resist-
ance on two fronts, however. Cultural relativists object to the infusion of
human rights principles into traditional practices. Classic liberal theorists
may also reject regulation of the private sphere as an intrusion into areas
which should be immune from state action.
181. For example, reservations taken on the grounds of conflict with Shari'a are
based in part on the concept of "equivalent" marital rights which assign stereotypical
roles to women and men under the guise of equality. Since women's domestic roles are
valued economically less than men's roles as community leaders and financial control-
lers, they are inconsistent with social and economic equality protections guaranteed by
the Women's Convention. See Cook, supra note 118, at 705.
182. In Thailand and Nepal, the law relies directly on religious law for resolution of
personal status questions. In other countries, such as Morocco, separate legal systems
exist for public and private issues; women's rights are perceived as private issues. See
Lynn P. Freedman, Women and the Law in Asia and the Near East 17 (1991) (on file
with author).
183. Mona Zulficar describes the implementation of Egyptian laws protecting equity
in employment. Women remain underpaid, underrepresented in many professions,
effectively prohibited from others, and hindered in their efforts to enter the work force
by the lack of necessary services, such as child care, and a culture that tells them in no
uncertain terms to remain in the home. Zulficar, supra note 164, at 1034-35.
184. See Freedman, supra note 182, at 17-18.
185. Women's Convention, supra note 73, arts. 5(a), 10(h), 12(2), 16.
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Cultural ambiguity towards or resistance to women's basic rights of
autonomy and self-determination permeates not only the political willing-
ness of states to act to protect women's interests but also the very interpre-
tation of rights themselves. Human rights principles prohibiting
unjustified killing, slavery, or torture are fundamental and prevail when in
conflict with other rights.- 86 Yet numerous violations of these rights, spe-
cific to women only, are not perceived as violations precisely because they
affect only women. Female circumcision, sex slavery, sati (the Hindu cus-
tom of burning a widow to death when her husband is cremated) are exam-
ples of gender-specific violations of human rights which are not treated
with the same seriousness as the more traditional violations of these norms
experienced primarily by men.187
This ambiguity is highlighted particularly when the issue is reproduc-
tive self-determination. One may successfully argue that reproductive self-
determination is another example of a right already secured by human
rights documents but marginalized because it protects primarily
women.188 It is precisely this consistent pattern of marginalization, how-
ever, which underscores the transformations required to guarantee repro-
ductive self-determination. A society that protects this right must reform
not only its laws but also its judgments about women's roles and status.18 9
In addition, whether the governmental interest has been anti-natalist
or pro-natalist, States traditionally have perceived women's reproductive
function as a legitimate matter of state control. The reinterpretation of
reproductive behavior as individual right rather than state prerogative
requires redefinition of the relationship between the woman and the State.
This redefinition encompasses the full scope of political, economic, and
social opportunities denied to women. Reproductive self-determination
can occur, therefore, only through a paradigm shift in the state's relation-
ship to women. In terms of state population policy, the recognition of
reproductive self-determination means that population programs must
become family planning programs. Voluntary family planning education
186. See Sullivan, supra note 116, at 817 (noting that certain core rights prevail over
religious rights in all circumstances).
187. Id. at 818-20. See generally Note, What's Culture Got to Do With It? Excising the
Harmful Tradition of Female Circumcision, 106 -lAv. L. REv. 1944 (1993) (analyzing
how female circumcision violates various international human rights declarations and
covenants); Robyn Cerny Smith, Note, Female Circumcision: Bringing Women's Perspec-
tives into the International Debate, 65 S. CAL. L. REv. 2449 (1992) (examining established
human rights violated by female circumcision); Carey Goldberg, Sex Slavery, Thailand to
New York, N.Y. TimEs, Sept. 11, 1995, at B1.
188. Certainly men are entitled to reproductive self-determination and forced sterili-
zation falls within these protections. Reproductive self-determination is of primary
importance to women who bear children and often lack control over their own reproduc-
tive behavior.
189. In truth, women throughout history have sought, sometimes desperately, to con-
trol their fertility. For example, 40-50 million women obtain abortions annually, of
which between 25-45% are illegal. DixoN-MuEaT supra note 7, at 163. Estimates indi-
cate that from 100,000 to 200,000 women die each year from the effects of these abor-
tions. Id.; Jodi L. Jacobson, Abortion and the Global Crisis in Women's Health, in BeYouN
THE NUMBERS 177, 180 (Laurie Ann Mazur ed., 1994).
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and birth planning must replace coercive regulation. In the context of
broader social policies, the incorporation of human rights principles into
population policy requires the State to focus on changing the context in
which reproductive decisions are made, rather than using its power to reg-
ulate directly reproductive behavior.
V. Population Policy and Women
The Cairo Programme is significant for its protection of women's reproduc-
tive self-determination through the concept of reproductive health. The
designation of reproductive health as the cornerstone of population policy
is an important advancement for several reasons. First, reproductive health
encompasses far more than access to contraception. It includes the full
spectrum of health needs associated with women's reproductive and sexual
activities. Thus, reproductive health moves population policy away from
the focus on women as "receptors" for contraceptive services and toward
recognition of the integrity of women as autonomous individuals.
Second, the term "reproductive health" is broader than reproductive
"rights." It encompasses not only self-determination but also the obliga-
tions of states to provide access to the health care and information neces-
sary to make reproductive choices. This definition is an essential catalyst
for change. Reproductive "choice" cannot be exercised in a vacuum.
Access to information and health services is critical to the exercise of repro-
ductive choice by women often denied access to educational, economic,
and political opportunities offered to men. Reproductive self-determina-
tion thus extends beyond the Western construct of negative rights to
encompass governmental responsibilities invoked by the principle of repro-
ductive health. This expansion is important because in many countries
women have difficulty accessing and obtaining reliable health care. 190
Finally, the Cairo Programme's emphasis on women's reproductive
self-determination negates the validity of governmental control of women's
reproductive lives for state purposes. The Cairo Programme specifies serv-
ices such as pre- and post-natal care, safe delivery, and treatment of infertil-
ity, reproductive infections, and sexually transmitted diseases as necessary
to reproductive health.191
190. Furthermore, medical research has overwhelmingly focused on male health.
Vanessa Merton, The Exclusion of Pregnant, Pregnable, and Once-Pregnable People (a.h.a.
Women) from Biomedical Research, 19 AM. J.L. & MED. 369, 370-71 (1993).
191. Cairo Programme, supra note 2, para. 7.6. The Programme further highlights
women's reproductive health by encouraging "safe motherhood" programs. Paragraph
8.19 provides:
Maternal deaths have very serious consequences within the family, given the
crucial role of the mother for her children's health and welfare .... Greater
attention to the reproductive health needs of female adolescents and young
women could prevent the major share of maternal morbidity and mortality
through prevention of unwanted pregnancies and any subsequent poorly man-
aged abortion ....
This provision, among others, was attacked by the Vatican as advocating abortion rights.
However, the language was retained. See id. at 97-99.
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The most significant aspect of the Cairo Programme is its unequivocal
inclusion of reproductive health as a reproductive right entitled to full
human rights protections. Paragraph 7.3 provides that
reproductive rights embrace certain human rights that are already recog-
nized in national laws, international human rights documents and other
consensus documents. These rights rest on the recognition of the basic
right of all couples and individuals to decide freely and responsibly the
number, spacing and timing of their children and to have the information
and means to do so, and the right to attain the highest standard of sexual
and reproductive health. It also includes their right to make decisions con-
cerning reproduction free of discrimination, coercion and violence, as
expressed in human rights documents.19 2
Although non-binding, this document provides a substantial founda-
tion for furthering the legal protection of reproductive self-determination.
Finally, the Cairo Programme directs family planning programs to
incorporate a human rights approach. Paragraph 7.12 emphasizes that
[t]he aim of family-planning programmes must be to enable couples and
individuals to decide freely and responsibly the number and spacing of their
children and to have the information and means to do so and to ensure
informed choice and make available a full range of safe and effective
methods.
The principle of informed free choice is essential to the long-term success of
family planning programmes. Any form of coercion has no part to play.193
This provision also criticizes family planning programs which empha-
size utilitarian goals rather than human rights:
In every society there are many social and economic incentives and disincen-
tives that affect individual decisions about child-bearing and family size.
Most such schemes have had only marginal impact on fertility and in some
cases have been counterproductive. Governmental goals for family planning
should be defined in terms of unmet needs for information and services.
Demographic goals, while legitimately the subject of government develop-
ment strategies, should not be imposed on family-planning providers in the
form of targets or quotas for the recruitment of clients. 19 4
192. Id. para 7.3 The majority of the reservations to this paragraph focused on
whether the terminology included the right to abortion. Numerous countries objected to
"reproductive rights" as code words for abortion. Similarly "coded" terminology in other
parts of the Programme were also the subject of intense debate and compromise. For
example, all references to rights and access associated with "fertility regulation" were
amended to read "regulation of fertility." The former phrase is one defined by the World
Health Organization to include certain abortion-related services. The compromise lan-
guage has no designated meaning. See Summary of the International Conference on Popu-
lation and Development, EARTH NEGOTIATIONs ButL., Sept. 14, 1994, at 1, 6.
193. Cairo Programme, supra note 2, para. 7.12.
194. Id.
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This language is notable because it directs population programs to focus
on the specific needs of individuals making reproductive decisions. In this
sense, the Cairo Programme rejects Malthusian theory.
The Cairo Programme also emphasizes the broader, more complex
connections between women's reproductive self-determination, socio-eco-
nomic change, and sustainable development. Paragraph 4.1 states, "[t]he
empowerment and autonomy of women and the improvement of their polit-
ical, social, economic and health status is a highly important end in itself.
In addition, it is essential for the achievement of sustainable
development." 195
The Cairo Programme is a consensus document and necessarily incor-
porates compromises in language and policy. These compromises, for the
most part, exemplify resistance to women's reproductive self-determination
that undermines the Cairo Programme and is inconsistent with the
Women's Convention. The source of this resistance is primarily religiously
derived traditions regarding women's roles. For example, the opening par-
agraph of the Programme's Principles requests States to implement the rec-
ommendations contained in the Programme "in conformity with
universally recognized international human rights."1 96 At the same time,
the Cairo Programme accords "full respect for the various religious and
ethical values and cultural backgrounds of its people .... ,,197 This "full
respect" language provides little incentive for many countries to change
their human rights or population policies. By recognizing both "universal
human rights" and cultural relativism, the language provides an interpre-
tive escape for countries which discriminate against women based on tradi-
tional practices. The protection of reproductive health, central to the entire
document, is undermined by language requesting States "to meet changing
reproductive health needs over the life cycle and to do so in ways sensitive
to the diversity of circumstances of local communities." 198 Missing from
this provision is language that limits accommodations of diversity to those
practices which are not violative of human rights.
Chapter IV of the Cairo Programme focuses specifically on gender
equity issues. It emphasizes the importance of improving the status of
women in social, economic, and political spheres as a critical goal in itself,
195. Id. para. 4.1. The principle upon which this directive is based provides that
"[aidvancing gender equality and the empowerment of women, and the elimination of
all kinds of violence against women, and ensuring women's ability to control their own
fertility, are cornerstones of population and development-related programmes." Id.
princ. 4.
196. Id. at 9.
197. Id. The full paragraph reads:
The implementation of the recommendations contained in the Programme of
Action is the sovereign right of each country, consistent with national laws and
development priorities, with full respect for the various religious and ethical
values and cultural backgrounds of its people, and in conformity with univer-
sally recognized international human rights.
Id. Similar language regarding cultural relativism is included in paragraph 1.11.
198. Id. para. 7.5(c).
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and as essential to changing reproductive behavior. The principle forming
the basis for action in this chapter provides, in part, that
[t]he power relations that impede women's attainment of healthy and fulfil-
ling lives operate at many levels of society, from the most personal to the
highly public.
In addition, improving the status of women also enhances their decision-
making capacity at all levels in all spheres of life, especially in the area of
sexuality and reproduction. This, in turn, is essential for the long-term suc-
cess of population programmes. 199
This paragraph captures the direct connections between gender equality,
reproductive self-determination, and successful family planning. Numer-
ous Islamic countries expressed reservations to this chapter to the extent it
conflicted with Shari'a.200 Even where no reservations were taken, the lan-
guage of equality was susceptible to different interpretations. For example,
Iran claimed the Arabic text contained an "incorrect" translation of "equal
rights" because it should translate into "men and women have equitable
rights in different fields." 2 0 The Cairo Programme quite explicitly recog-
nizes that men's attitudes are key to transformations of gender stereotypes
because "men exercise preponderant power in nearly every sphere of life,
ranging from personal decisions regarding the size of families to the policy
and programme decisions taken at all levels of Government." 20 2
The Cairo Programme affirms the family as the "basic unit of soci-
ety."20 3 This principle also raises potential conflicts with the document's
emphasis on individual rights.20 4 The definition of reproductive rights
includes the "recognition of the basic right of all couples and individuals to
decide freely and responsibly the number, spacing and timing of their chil-
dren .... ,"205 While some states made reservations as to the entire chapter
on reproductive health and rights, numerous countries took exception to
according these rights to individuals rather than couples.20 6 Although this
199. Id. para. 4.1
200. Afghanistan, Jordan, Kuwait, Iran, Libya, Yemen, Djibouti, Brunei Darussalam,
and the United Arab Emirates entered reservations as to any language in the document
which is inconsistent with Shari'a. Id. at 136-41. Many of these reservations also took
exception to any language or policies in conflict with national customs or traditions.
201. International Conference on Population and Development Department of Public
Information, International Conference on Population and Development Concludes in Cairo,
5-13 September, Press Release POP/CAI/24, at 3 (Sept. 13, 1994) (on file with author).
202. Cairo Programme, supra note 2, para. 4.24.
203. Id. para. 5.1.
204. See, e.g., id. paras. 7.2-7.3, 7.14. The description of the family in chapter 5 also
resulted in numerous reservations because of the language "various forms of the family."
Id. para. 5.1. Countries making reservations as to this language were concerned it could
be interpreted to mean support for family forms other than the heterosexual marriage of
man and woman. See id. at 89-99 (reservations of El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua,
and the Vatican).
205. Id. para. 7.3
206. The Vatican and Malta expressed reservations to the entire chapter. See id. at
147, 149. Several Islamic nations made reservations as to reproductive rights terminol-
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reference to "couples and individuals" has been accepted language since
the 1974 Population Conference in Budapest, the reservations demonstrate
the unwillingness of many countries to view women as individuals capable
of independent reproductive choices. The reservation of Egypt is illuminat-
ing, for it calls for the deletion of the term "individuals" based on its under-
standing that "all the questions dealt with by the Programme of Action in
this regard relate to harmonious relations between couples united by the
bond of marriage in the context of the concept of the family as the primary
cell of society."20 7 In most States making reservations to this language,
men are the decision-makers within the family. Reservations to the individ-
ual's right to make reproductive decisions directly affects women's ability
to exercise reproductive self-determination.
The compromises reached at Cairo also demonstrate the international
tension between those who view population policy primarily in utilitarian
terms and those who insist that population programs be based upon
human rights principles. Principle 5 of the Cairo Programme describes
population programs as "integral parts of cultural, economic and social
development, the principal aim of which is to improve the quality of life of
all people."20 8 In fact, the Principles repeatedly emphasize human rights
as the priority.20 9 Nonetheless, the primary population objective articu-
lated, "to facilitate the demographic transition as soon as possible in coun-
tries where there is an imbalance between demographic rates and social,
economic and environmental goals, while fully respecting human
rights,"210 presents a complex practical challenge even when a state wants
to place human rights at the center of its population policy.
The articulation of reproductive rights is qualified several times by lan-
guage requiring individuals, in exercise of their rights, to "take into
account ... their responsibilities towards the community."2 11 This lan-
guage of responsibility to the community acknowledges those States which
value the community over the individual. It also limits the legitimacy of the
exercise of reproductive rights to those contexts in which the individual
acts "responsibly" with regard to the larger social value of population
ogy deemed in conflict with the Shari'a. Several Latin American countries also made
reservations as to this language to the extent it could be interpreted to include abortion
rights.
207. Id. at 96. El Salvador, Libya, Jordan, Afghanistan, and the Dominican Republic
also expressed similar reservations. Id. at 89-100.
208. Id. princ. 5.
209. Principle 1 recognizes that "Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of
person." Id. princ. 1. Principle 2 recommends that "Countries should ensure that all
individuals are given the opportunity to make the most of their potential." Id. princ. 2.
Principle 3 stresses "the human person is the central subject of development" and "the
lack of development may not be invoked to justify the abridgement of human rights."
Id. princ. 3.
210. Id. para. 6.3.
211. Id. para. 7.3. The paragraph continues by emphasizing that "The promotion of
the responsible exercise of these rights for all people should be the fundamental basis
for [population programs]." Id. The right of the individual is defined as the right to
decide "freely and responsibly." Id.
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objectives. 212 In this regard, the Cairo Programme attempts to be too
many things to too many interests. Population goals, while "legitimately
the subject of government development strategies, should not be imposed
on family-planning providers in the form of targets or quotas for the
recruitment of clients."213 This language is ambivalent about many aspects
of the relationship between governmental policy and the individual. For
example, how does a government "legitimately" use demographic goals and
at the same time allow individuals to "freely" decide the number and spac-
ing of their children? The prohibition of targets and quotas in the recruit-
ment of clients leaves open the possibility that targets and quotas may be
used appropriately for other purposes.
The recent Beijing Declaration and Programme of Action, adopted by
consensus at the Fourth United Nations Conference on Women in Septem-
ber, 1995, builds on the principles of reproductive self-determination first
articulated at Cairo. The relationship between reproductive health and
self-determination for women is emphasized throughout the document.
The Beijing Declaration specifically asserts that "the neglect of women's
reproductive rights severely limits their opportunities in public and private
life, including opportunities for education and economic and political
empowerment. The ability of women to control their own fertility forms an
important basis for the enjoyment of other rights."21 4 The provisions on
women's health address both private and public reforms necessary to
assure reproductive health and protect "reproductive rights."215 The docu-
ment recognizes how critical elimination of gender discrimination is to
reproductive autonomy by calling on States to "take action to ensure the
conditions necessary for women to exercise their reproductive rights
"216
The most notable provision in the Beijing Programme regarding repro-
ductive rights includes sexual harm as an act of violence against women.
Paragraph 115 explicitly notes that "violence against women include[s] vio-
lation of the human rights of women in situations of ... forced preg-
nancy[,] forced sterilization.., forced abortion, [and] coercive/forced use
212. See also id. para. 7.12 ("The aim of family-planning programmes must be to
enable couples and individuals to decide freely and responsibly the number and spacing
of their children ....").
213. Id.
214. Beijing Declaration, supra note 133, para. 98.
215. The Beijing Declaration asks States to
reinforce laws, reform institutions and promote norms and practices that elimi-
nate discrimination against women and encourage both women and men to take
responsibility for their sexual and reproductive behavior, ensure full respect for
the physical integrity of the human body, and take action to ensure the condi-
tions necessary for women to exercise their reproductive rights and eliminate,
when possible, coercive laws and practices.
Id. para. 108(d).
216. Id. Several other provisions in the document address women's reproductive
health. See id. para. 110 (promoting research and dissemination of information on
women's health); id. paras. 111-12 (increased resources and monitoring).
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of contraceptives .... ,,217 This provision is important for two reasons. It
is the first document to define specific reproductive behavior as protected
rights. Second, it brings the violation of these rights squarely within the
framework of human rights protections.
218
VI. The Role of Law in Population Planning
The utilitarian nature of population programs creates particular pressures
to de-emphasize human rights. In States feeling severe pressure to moder-
ate population growth, the blueprint of social, economic, and political
development embodied in the Cairo Programme may require massive reor-
ganization of society that States may be unwilling or unable to effect. 2 19 In
particular, as these changes relate to improvement in the status of women,
significant resistance may exist to the fundamental premises of the Cairo
Programme. With regard to those States willing to improve the status of
women and use human rights as the cornerstone of their population pro-
grams, many may believe that more utilitarian approaches must be imple-
mented during lengthy transitions. Even if the State takes immediate legal
and political actions to remove discriminatory practices, changes in educa-
tional, social, political, and economic opportunities cannot be realized at
once.
Transitional States, therefore, should be evaluated far differently than
States which evidence a systematic pattern of human rights violations.
This pattern occurs primarily in two situations: States that allow Malthu-
sian policies to dominate population policy at the expense of human
rights, and States that systematically discriminate against women. Often
the two overlap. If the international community is serious about popula-
tion policies based on human rights principles, further steps should be
taken to achieve this goal. First, reproductive rights as defined in the Cairo
Programme should be explicitly defined in treaty form. These norms
should be developed by reference to women's and men's reproductive
needs and experiences. Codifying reproductive rights into treaty form
likely will be met with significant international resistance. As described
throughout this Article, reproductive self-determination is rejected by many
States because it conflicts with religious or cultural traditions. Many States
that subordinate women's interests to men's also will resist ceding to
217. Id. para. 115.
218. This provision builds on another U.N. declaration. See Declaration on the Elimi-
nation of Violence Against Women, G.A. Res. 48/104, U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., Agenda
Item III, U.N. Doc. A/RES/48/104 (1994), reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 1049 (1994). Article
4(c) calls on states to "[e]xercise due diligence to prevent, investigate and, in accordance
with national legislation, punish acts of violence against women, whether those acts are
perpetrated by the State or by private persons[.]" Id. art. 4(c).
219. The overwhelming amount of foreign aid money in this area goes to family plan-
ning programs rather than reproductive health or improving the status of women. HART-
MaNN, supra note 30, at 114. Michael Marcus, Note, United States Foreign Population
Assistance Programs: Antiabortion Propaganda?, 15 BRooK. J. INT'L L. 843, 851-54
(1989); Sharon L. Camp, The Politics of U.S. Population Assistance, in BEYoND THE NUM-
BERS 122, 122-34 (Laurie Ann Mazur ed., 1994).
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women the decision-making authority inherent in reproductive self-deter-
mination.220 In the interim, human rights treaties that in fact protect the
rights of self-determination incorporated in reproductive rights, including
prohibitions against violence, should be interpreted to protect reproductive
self-determination. Finally, the prohibitions on gender discrimination con-
tained in the Women's Convention and other human rights treaties should
not be undermined in the name of cultural relativism. The absence of a
complaint procedure under the Women's Convention should be remedied
immediately with an appropriate protocol.221
Legal reform and enforcement can establish a framework for the more
difficult task of changing traditions which devalue individual choice and
disadvantage women. Population policy must ultimately address the rea-
sons that women have many children. These reasons derive from patriar-
chal cultures and the reproductive role accorded women in these cultures.
Reproductive roles are reinforced by the economic, political, and social
structures created by patriarchal societies that leave women few alterna-
tives to child-bearing. Law must function in this context to remove barriers
to opportunities imposed on women and to assure enforcement and protec-
tion of rights where appropriate. This process also must redefine cultural
expectations. The mere articulation of rights does little in a milieux where
exercise of rights is neither understood nor encouraged. Law must func-
tion therefore to establish a context in which the meaningful exercise of
rights can be secured.
The rights-based nature of this type of legal reform may have little
credibility in states which are not modeled on Western rights theory. The
value of universal international norms becomes critical at this point. The
debate about universality versus cultural relativism is essentially a dispute
over whether moral principles are universal. If morals are merely cultur-
ally derived, the principle of absolute universality is less persuasive. Inter-
national human rights law, however, is premised on the perception that
sufficient consensus exists on certain moral principles to support their
220. Some States will object to various aspects of reproductive self-determination,
such as abortion rights or prohibitions on female genital mutilation. Elizabeth K.
Spahn, Waitingfor Credentials: Feminist Theories of Enforcement of International Human
Rights, 44 AM. U. L. REv. 1053, 1058-59 (1995).
221. See Draft Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women, 44 Am. U. L. REv. 1419 (1995). Article 17 of the
Women's Convention establishes the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination
Against Women. Women's Convention, supra note 73, art. 17. This committee is elected
and charged with overseeing the implementation of the Women's Convention by States.
It monitors compliance based primarily on reports submitted by States Parties. The
Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action recommended that a complaint procedure
be incorporated which would allow both individuals and other States to lodge com-
plaints against a State for violation of the rights protected by the Women's Convention.
Vienna Declaration, supra note 108, para. 11(40). This optional protocol is a separate
legal document which must be ratified specifically by States in order to be binding
against them. A similar optional protocol already exists in connection with the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Cook, supra note 84, at 1015.
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transformation into international norms. 222 The widespread ratification of
numerous international human rights treaties is evidence that this percep-
tion is not misconceived. Human rights law must be sensitive to cultural
diversity in its interpretation of norms. But this sensitivity should not
extend to acceptance of systematic disadvantage upon a designated group
in the name of cultural relativism. Discrimination against women and
denial of their status as autonomous individuals should be interpreted as
clear violations of human rights norms. Enforcement of human rights obli-
gations can function to secure change which otherwise would not occur.223
The effectiveness of a rights-based approach to securing reproductive
self-determination for women also has been challenged by numerous femi-
nist commentators. 224 The absence of women's experiences in the formu-
lation of international human rights norms certainly undermines the
validity of those norms. 225 If the law is gendered to reflect the interests of
men, incorporation of women into its protections is inadequate to address
the needs of women.226 The general restrictions of human rights norms to
state action makes the system further suspect because women's exper-
iences occur predominantly within the private sphere. While these obser-
vations are accurate, they do not necessarily lead to rejection of a rights-
based approach to women's reproductive needs. Although the incorpora-
tion of women into the formulation and interpretation of rights discourse
and social policy is the only real means of assuring a paradigm shift in
relations between women and the state, human rights norms provide a
powerful tool precisely because they are the dominant mode of change.
The current effort to incorporate women's perspectives into rights dis-
course will further enhance the efficacy of such enforcement. In fact, the
focus of human rights law on individual, as opposed to group, rights ulti-
mately may favor the articulation and enforcement of women's reproduc-
tive rights. As feminists have noted, any legal emphasis on a collective
standard, such as family or community, tends to validate both the male
perspective and male control. 227 A strong articulation of reproductive
rights as personal to the individual will enhance, at least under law,
women's authority and autonomy.
222. These norms include self-determination, equality, and liberty. See supra note
151.
223. For a discussion of the use of human rights norms in domestic courts, see Lisa
C. Stratton, Note, The Right to Have Rights: Gender Discrimination in Nationality Laws,
77 MINN. L. REv. 195 (1992).
224. See. e.g., Karen Engle, International Human Rights and Feminism: When Dis-
courses Meet, 13 MICH. J. I.N'L L. 517 (1992); Fiona Beveridge & Siobhan Mullally,
International Human Rights and Body Politics, in LAW AND BODY Pouics 240 (Jo
Bridgeman & Susan Milins eds., 1995).
225. See Catharine A. MacKinnon, Crimes of War, Crimes of Peace, in ON HUMAN
RIGHTs 83, 100 (Stephen Shute & Susan Hurley, eds., 1993) (concluding that sexual and
reproductive harm to women "occurs in forms and settings and legal postures that over-
lap every recognized human rights convention but is addressed, effectively and as such,
by none." "Abuses of women as women rarely seem to fit what these laws and their
enforcing bodies have in mind. ").
226. Beveridge & Mullaly, supra note 224, at 261.
227. See id. at 248-51.
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Conclusion
The role of law in population policy is two-fold. Human rights principles
provide the basis for enforcement of reproductive self-determination.
These principles should be strengthened through the specific incorpora-
tion of reproductive self-determination into treaties. Law must also, how-
ever, serve as an educator and motivator of social change to establish a
context in which the meaningful exercise of rights can be secured. Only
then can the rights protected by law be realized. Both functions must be
successful for the law to effectively secure human rights norms as the foun-
dation for population policies. The utilitarian nature of population control
programs and their wide-ranging impact on a broad array of social policies
make the application of human rights norms alone inadequate to assure
protection.
This is particularly true in the context of reproductive self-determina-
tion for women. The full range of social and economic laws which leave
women few options other than having children must be changed. Self-
determination is the legal norm by which perceptions of women as womb
should be challenged. At that point, reproductive self-determination will
have a real value to the many women throughout the world who currently
live without control of their lives or their bodies.

